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This Article examines the content-related liability exposure of health care
providers operating in cyberspace (cybermedicine).t The Article maps real space
theories of liability such as professional negligence, misrepresentation and products
liability to cybermedicine fact patterns.
This Article examines cybermedicine in contrast to the more widely discussed
but narrower issue of telemedicine.2 The latter typically refers to technologies,
primarily preconvergence telephony, satellite and video, used to patch geographical
holes in health coverage.3 Thus, telemedicine is to medicine what distance learning
is to education.4 Just as telemedicine technologies and goals have been more
limited, so too have the legal issues been analyzed in a narrower regulatory5 or
t Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. The author thanks Christopher Hoffman and Tonia
Pfannenstiel (SLU Law 2000) for their diligent editorial assistance.
t Mention of a particular website in this Article is for illustrative or hypothetical purposes only.
There is no suggestion and no suggestion should be taken that publishing a cybermedicine website itself
constitutes actionable behavior or that sites mentioned herein have practiced cyber-malpractice or are
liable on any other theory.
I For the classic exposition on virtual space or cyberspace, see Mitchell Kapor & John Perry
Barlow, Across the Electronic Frontier (Electronic Frontier Foundation, Washington D.C.), July 10,
1990 (visited Apr. 20, 1999) <http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/JohnPerryBarlow/
electronic frontier.effh. Real space is used in this Article as the antonym to cyberspace, signifying the
physical world.
2 See Daniel McCarthy, The Virtual Health Economy: Telemedicine and the Supply of Primary
Care Physicians in RuralAmerica, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 111, 112 (1995).
3 See id. at 112-16. For example, California has defined telemedicine as "[t]he practice of health
care delivery, diagnosis, consultation, treatment, transfer of medical data, and education using
interactive audio, video, or data communications. Neither a telephone conversation nor an electronic
mail message between a health care practitioner and patient constitutes 'telemedicine' for purposes of
this section." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 2290.5(a)(1) (West 1999).
4 Cf. Helen Leskovac, Distance Learning in Legal Education: Implications of Frame Relay
Videoconferencing, 8 ALB. L.J. Sd. & TECH. 305 (1998) (discussing distance learning as applied to
legal education).
5 For examples of federal and state regulation of telemedicine, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1374.13 (1999) (recognizing telemedicine as a legitimate means of receiving medical care by defining
and regulating payment for telemedicine under Medi-Cal). See generally Christina M. Racket,
Telemedicine Today and Tomorrow: Why "Virtual" Privacy is Not Enough, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
167, 183-90 (1997) (discussing existing federal telemedicine legislation and proposing changes). Cf.
Metpath, Inc. V. Myers, 462 F. Supp. 1104, 1108-13 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (examining the constitutionality
of a California regulatory statute authorizing the state to revoke or suspend the license of a clinical
328 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 25 NOS. 2&3 1999
licensure 6 issues.7 In contrast, cybermedicine is a broader concept. It encompasses
not only the technology and legal issues of telemedicine, but also a far greater array
of nontraditional and unique, technology-enabled interactions among health care
providers and consumer-patients. 8 Cybermedicine includes marketing, relationship
creation, advice, prescribing and selling drugs and devices, and as with all things in
cyberspace, levels of interactivity as yet unknown. 9
Part II summarizes the themes likely to pervade the discourse during the
emergence of cybermedicine and the mapping of liability models (cyber-
malpractice) to World Wide Web (web) business models. To provide a firmer
context, Part III briefly describes the presence of health care providers in cyber-
space, and explains how some of their business models translate into cybermedicine.
Then Part IV, V and VI identify three cybermedicine fact patterns that illustrate
some or all of the themes identified earlier and that are likely to attract the initial
forays into cyber-malpractice litigation. These fact patterns are: (1) web marketing
by health care institutions; (2) web-based marketing and product support by pharma-
ceutical manufacturers; and (3) the proliferation of health-oriented advice sites. Part
VII concludes with some brief observations about early attempts at managing cyber-
malpractice exposure.
II. CYBERMEDICINE AND CYBER-MALPRACTICE: IDENTIFYING THE
THEMES
The use of a telephone by a physician to communicate a misdiagnosis to a
patient does not automatically implicate telecommunications law. Equally, not every
web or electronic mail (e-mail)O contact injects cyberlaw concerns or issues into
laboratory that advertises to the public).
6See Julie M. Kearney, Telemedicine: Ringing in a New Era of Health Care Delivery, 5
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 289, 297-300 (1997) (discussing how telemedicine is making changes in
licensure laws necessary because of interstate access issues). See, e.g., Katie Wood, Physicians,
Physician's Assistants, and Respiratory Care: Require Out-of-State Physicians Who Provide Patient
Care in Georgia Via Telemedicine to Hold Georgia License, 14 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 238 (1997)
(discussing Georgia's statute mandating licensing of physicians who enter the State for consultation via
telemedicine).
7 See Christopher J. Caryl, Note, Malpractice and Other Legal Issues Preventing The Development
of Telemedicine, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 173, 179 (1998); Linda C. Fentiman, The Legal Questions From
Tele-Medicine Five Major Issues Emerge, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 3, 1998, at 7; Phyllis Forrester Granade,
Medical Malpractice Issues Related to the Use of Telemedicine-An Analysis of the Ways In Which
Telecommunications Affects the Principles of Medical Malpractice, 73 N.D. L. REV. 65, 87 (1997)
(discussing how not having a state license affects telemedicine and negligence liability); Christopher
Guttman-McCabe, Telemedicine's Imperiled Future? Funding, Reimbursement, Licensing And Privacy
Hurdles Face A Developing Technology, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 161, 169, 171 (1997)
(stating that physician licensing and differing state regulations inhibit telemedicine's growth). See
generally Lynette A. Herscha, Is There a Doctor in the House? Licensing and Malpractice Issues
Involved in Telemedicine, 2 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 8 (1996) (discussing both licensure and malpractice
standard-setting issues).
8 See generally Beverly J. Tyler, Cyberdoctors: The Virtual House.call-Actual Practice of
Medicine on the Internet is Here, 31 IND. L. REV. 259 (1998) (discussing the Cyberdoctors website and
how it demonstrates unique interactions between health care providers and patients).
9 See generally id. (discussing how the Cyberdoctors website uses the Internet to give medical
advice and treatment).
10 See generally Beverly Kane & Daniel Sands, Guidelines for the Clinical Use of Electronic Mail
with Patients 5 1. AM. MED. INFORM. ASS'N. 104-11 (1998) (discussing the use of electronic mail (e-
mail) for communicating between physicians and patients); Kenneth W. Goodwin, ETHICS, COMPUTINO,
AND MEDICINE (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (discussing the use of information technology in the
provider-patient relationship).
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health care provider liability cases. Thus, not every cyberspace intrusion into
traditional malpractice law will prompt radical reengineering of doctrinal stalwarts.
However, certain themes will greet the early litigious stages of developing
cybermedicine; themes that are rooted in web business models and emerging
provider liability doctrine.
A. THE EXPANSION OF PROVIDER LIABILITY
This Article uses health care provider liability as a broad container for liability
constructs that go beyond the paradigmatic malpractice case.It Horizontally, the
potential pool of defendants is expanded to include managed care organizations
(MCOs) and, somewhat more controversially, pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Vertically, a far broader array of fact patterns is entertained, contemplating a
growing number of "information torts,"12 duties owed to nonpatients, product supply
cases and access to care issues.
A somewhat cliched cyberspace. observation nevertheless provides an
appropriate starting point.' 3 Cybermedicine and hence cyber-malpractice will spill
over traditional state or national borders. Thus, relatively provincial health care
provider liability doctrinal structures will confront overlapping regulatory and liabil-
ity systems,' 4 intermingled with very difficult jurisdictional and extraterritoriality
issues.15
Even if one concentrates on domestic intrastate provider activities, the
implications of cyberspace are far-reaching. In real space, we can usually
distinguish between a pharmacy and a pharmaceutical manufacturer, between a
physician group and an MCO, but such distinctions are not always so obvious when
viewing a health care provider web page. Cyberspace technology and business
models encourage high levels of integration. For example, surf to CyberPharmacy,t6
apparently a CyberDocs 7 sister site, and you will find the following encouragement:
I The typical malpractice case involves a misdiagnosis or mistreatment of a patient by a doctor or
hospital, implicating professional standards or informed consent.
12 1 have been using this phrase for some time, see Nicolas P. Terry, Apologetic Tort Think:
Autonomy and Information Torts, 38 ST. LOUIS L.J. 189 (1993). I make no particular claim to its
originality, see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, the First Amendment, and Equal Access to
Electronic Networks, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 132 (1992) (using the phrase "information tort"). Also
note that the phrase informational tort is often found in discussions of privacy law and theory.
13 As noted by David Johnson and David Post:
Cyberspace radically undermines the relationship between legally significant (online)
phenomena and physical location. The rise of the global computer network is destroying
the link between geographical location and: (I) the power of local governments to assert
control over online behavior;, (2) the effects of online behavior on individuals or things;
(3) the legitimacy of a local sovereign's efforts to regulate global phenomena; and (4)
the ability of physical location to give notice of which sets of rules apply. The Net thus
radically subverts the system of rule-making based on borders between physical spaces,
at least with respect to the claim that Cyberspace should naturally be governed by
territorially defined rules.
Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (1996).
14 Viagra was officially available in the United Kingdom later than in the United States, but not as
part of the socialized National Health Service package. See John Vidal, Desperately Seeking Viagra,
THE GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 26, 1998, at 3, available in 1998 WL 18667701.
15 See Hope Viner Samborn, Small World, Big Questions, ABA J., Feb. 1999, at 78 (discussing the
importance of establishing jurisdictional rules for the Internet to limit liability).
16 CyberPharmacy (visited Jan. 25, 1999) <http://www.cyberpharmacy.com>.
17 Cyberdocs (visited Apr. 16, 1999) <http://www.cyberdocs.com>. See infra note 183 and
accompanying text.
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If you are seeking an online consultation with a physician for medical
purposes, you may wish to check the CyberDocs Web site, where,
depending on your geographic origin, you may be able to obtain an
immediate (24hr/7day) or appointment-based keyboard and/or video-
conferencing consultation with a live, board-certified physician.' 8
Even discrete corporate entities appear integrated, due to the increasingly
seamless transitions from one site to another along carefully chosen links. Factor in
banner advertisements that may be placed by site participants, sponsors, cross-
marketers or generic advertisers, and often it is difficult to fathom the nature of a
visited site.
Further, courts will be faced with many new liability scenarios as the virtual
world permits interactions simply not possible in real space. When such cases
emerge, lawyers naturally engage in a process of mapping, or analogizing, from real
space to these novel virtual space cases. 19 Thus, courts faced with health care
provider liability actions premised on acts or omissions in cyberspace will be
working from a strong, mature base of applicable and already expanding doctrine.
B. AN EXPLOSION OF INFORMATION TORTS
The most challenging real world health care provider liability actions involve
information torts. These actions, such as informed consent and failure to warn,
examine the relative information costs incurred by providers and patients rather than
providers' insensitive interpersonal acts or substandard quality of care.20 In virtual
space, all torts are information torts,21 and information has very different costs in
cyberspace.22 The costs of access to information are dramatically decreased because
it is cheaper both to give advice and to receive it.23 As has been noted, "It]he Web is
the ultimate subversive medium. It allows people information they couldn't have got
before. Doctors will just have to get used to patients with information." 24
As the web dramatically increases the occasions for information provision and
exchange, the result will be an explosion of health care provider actions that are
concerned primarily with ex post facto judgment of the quality of information flow
between provider and patient. Courts have thus far been hesitant to impose liability
18 CyberPharmacy (visited Jan. 25, 1999) <http://www.cyberpharmacy.com/content/
newprescription.htm>. Of course, we already have some real space quasi-integrated services in, for
example, retail ophthalmology and optometry. See, e.g., The LensCrafters Eye Exam Advantage
(visited Feb. 5, 1999) <http://www.lenscrafters.com/eyecarelbuyglasseslensexam.html> (stating that
"Located next to every LensCrafters is an affiliated Licensed Doctor of Optometry.").
19 See, e.g., American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating
that "[n]ot surprisingly, much of the legal analysis of Intemet-related issues has focused on seeking a
familiar analogy for the unfamiliar").
20 See, e.g., Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996) (alleging the physician failed to
obtain the plaintiff's informed consent for surgery).
211 ignore what I view as "false" cybertorts, such as the real space battery of the plaintiff whom
the defendant first met some months earlier in a cyberspace chat room. See Man Receives 40 Years In
Killing That He Mentioned Online, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1998, at Al7 (visited Feb. 5, 1999)
<http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/10/biztech/articles/lOconfession.html>.
22 See Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian"
World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 116-17 (1997) (comparing conventional
transaction costs to the costs generated through online transactions).
23 See id.
24 Hilary Bower, Open Wide and Say Ah, THE GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 12, 1999, at 14, available
in LEXIS, News Library, GUARDN file (quoting Lynne McTaggart).
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in cases where inadequate information has not been directly linked to consent.25
Such positions are likely to come under increasing attack. These information tort
cases will not be easy. As the web decreases many traditional information costs, it
dramatically increases others. For example, the huge amount of information
available increases sorting costs incurred by the consumer-patient. 26 Further, even
leaving aside cases of fraud, electronic delivery complicates authenticating the
source and assessing the reliability of information. 27 Overall, the courts will be
seriously challenged in creating mechanisms that properly allocate information cost
risks between providers and patients.
Finally, it should not be forgotten that the web will dramatically decrease
patient information costs, and later transaction costs, in discovering the existence of
tortious provider behavior. Patients suffering adverse results will be more likely to
discover a possible provider-related cause and initiate a process that will lead to
litigation.
C. THE SACRIFICE OF IMMUNITIES TO BUSINESS MODELS
Health care providers and drug manufacturers have discovered direct-to-
consumer (DTC) or consumer-oriented marketing. 28 Providers have used the web
because it has become a major force in corporate marketing strategies. 29 Yet, this
embrace of mass media and interactive marketing has some interesting legal costs.
This theme may best be illustrated by two concrete examples that are expanded
on below. First, the development of institutional provider (hospital or MCO) liability
in the real world has been slowed by decades of decisions tending to favor an
individual health care provider, typically physician, liability paradigm. 30 In more
recent years, some doctrinal rubble has been cleared. What has emerged is a picture
of institutional provider liability that most often is triggered by institutional actions
or expectation-creating marketing plans that deemphasize the individual physician
paradigm in favor of an aggregated, tightly integrated and industrialized model.31
This picture seems to map perfectly the business models chosen by health care
institutions in cyberspace. 32
Second, drug manufacturers have employed the learned intermediary doctrine 33
25 See, e.g., Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993); Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal.
1980); Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1997).
26 See Ira S. Nathenson, Internet Infoglut and Invisible Ink: Spamdexing Search Engines with
Meta Tags, 12 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 43, 90 (1998).
2 7 Docs Explore whether Online Medicine is Good Medicine, MED. INDUS. TODAY, Aug. 7, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, MEDTDY File.
28 Direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising targets its advertising directly to the ultimate consumer,
in this case, the patient. See Draft Guidance for the Industry, Consumer-Directed Broadcast
Advertisements; Availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,171, 43,172 (1997).
2 9 See generally Kristen Green, Note, Marketing Health Care Products on the Internet: A
Proposal for Updated Regulations, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 365 (1998) (discussing the extent of drug
promotion on the Internet).
30 See Rebecca O'Neill, Surrogate Health Care Decisions for Adults in Illinois: Answers to the
Legal Questions that Health Care Providers Face on a Daily Basis, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 411, 461
(1998).
31 See generally Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Liability and the Evolution of
the American Health Care System, 108 HARv. L. REv. 381, 381 (1994) (describing the developing trend
toward institutional liability rather than individual liability).
32 See discussion infra Part IV.
33 The learned intermediary doctrine holds that an adequate warning by a prescribing physician
discharges a manufacturer's duty to warn. See Joseph G. Blute, Courts Struggle with the Learned
332 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 25 NOS. 2&3 1999
to insulate themselves from certain product liability warning duties. 34 That doctrine,
ostensibly in place to fulfill a warning function, has permitted pharmaceutical
manufacturers to transfer some drug-risk information costs to physicians and
patients.35 Yet, the entire doctrine is premised on an extremely low level of contact
and interaction between manufacturer and patient.36 This is a premise that cannot
withstand the empirical evidence of manufacturer web marketing.37 Both of these
scenarios are examples of how institutions and manufacturers are increasing their
real world vulnerability because of their virtual space activities. This is a theme or
trend that is likely to flow beyond these immediate examples and initiate new forms
of representational liability.
D. THE RECOGNITION THAT TARGETED PLAINTIFFS ARE FORESEEABLE
Courts dealing with ex post facto liability models have tended to be negative
toward liability theories with fact patterns involving injury-causing phenomena that
exhibit low transaction costs. 38 This is particularly true in cases involving mass
media exposure, 39 where liability is posited on the transmission of ideas rather than
acts or omissions, or where the plaintiff relies on theories such as misrepre-
sentation. 40 Similar issues appear in the case of certain types of damages, such as
emotional and economic, that tend to have ripple effects.4 1 All cases seem to
contemplate a relatively anonymous, untargeted and undifferentiated plaintiff pool.4
2
Such judicial hesitance is rooted in the sentiment that exposure to such forms of
liability or damages should be closely controlled lest the courts become clogged. 43
A frequent surrogate for this concern is the floodgates of litigation argument,44 a
statement of systemic concern perhaps best expressed by Justice Cardozo. He
cautioned against exposing defendants to "liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." 45 These sentiments also reflect a
Intermediary Rule Exceptions, PROD. LIAB. L. & STRATEGY, May 1997, at 3, 3.
3 4 See, e.g., Ortho Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 549 (Ind. App. 1979)
(finding the pharmaceutical manufacturer not liable under a strict tort liability theory).
35 Courts have permitted pharmaceutical manufacturers to externalize these costs by holding that a
manufacturer's "liability turns on whether it sufficiently warned [the prescribing physician] of a drug's
dangerous propensities." Crisostomo v. Stanley, 857 F.2d 1146, 1152 (7th Cir. 1988).
3 6 See Barry R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability for Bad Outcomes from Drug Therapy, 44 DRAKE L.
REv. 377, 387 (1996).
37 See discussion infra Part V.
38 See Joel Rothstein Wolfson, Electronic Mass Media Information Providers and Section 552 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts: The First Amendment Casts a Long Shadow, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 67,
118 (1997) (stating courts are hesitant to apply liability to "mass information providers," such as those
on the Internet).
39 See id. (discussing the liability of mass information providers for negligently creating or
disseminating information).
40 See id. at 73.
41 See id. at 105.
42 See id.
43 See generally Stanley Sporkin, Reforming the Federal Judiciary, 46 SMU L. REV. 751, 757
(1992) (arguing federalizing crimes has resulted in an overloading of the federal courts).
44 The "floodgates of litigation" concern is a combination of two problems: (1) subjecting courts
to a socially expensive and haltingly burdensome amount of suits based on frivolous or nonmeritorious
claims; and (2) subjecting possible defendants to suits not aimed at equitable recovery or compensation
but at forcing defendants to settle to avoid expensive litigation costs. By opening the floodgates, there
would be an undermining of the court system and a chilling of potentially socially beneficial activities
by possible defendants in society.
45 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441,444 (1931). It is worth noting that, in
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concern for the system, i.e. costs or inefficiencies that could be incurred when losses
that are spread out are harvested for reallocation. 46 Such pervasive themes or
concerns frequently find doctrinal voice in judicial wavering as to finding a close
connection between defendant's alleged negligence and the plaintiffs' injuries or
some sense of a lack of moral blameworthiness.47
Modem electronic commerce (e-commerce) and its enabling technologies break
from the underlying precept on which defense victories in these cases are based.
Obviously in cyberspace companies can have generalized mass marketing and
announcements. Companies can literally reach an indeterminate class. It is already
established as a tenet of cyberspace law that websites carry the potential for almost
unlimited noncorporeal interaction.48 The product of such interaction and the
gathering of user information allows a high level of profiling and item targeting, of
sensitivity to the extremely narrow, personalized needs, wants, symptoms and
conditions of the targeted person.49
Thus, cybermedicine will suffer from what might be viewed as the penalty of
Ultramares, Justice Cardozo specifically distinguished between injuries caused by "physical force" and
"the circulation of a thought or the release of the explosive power resident in words." Id. at 445.
46 Take a situation where damages (economic loss or emotional harm) are easily spread (has low
transaction costs) and the damages are spread to an indeterminate number of random plaintiffs. It can
be argued that it is more efficient to let the damages lie where they fell than to attempt to "harvest"
them through the legal system so as to redistribute them, first, to a defendant and thereafter to the
members of the defendant's insurance risk pool. This argument need not be viewed as correct; all that
matters is that judges perceive this as a poor spreading scenario. Thus as Lord Denning said,
It is not sensible to saddle losses on this scale on to one sole contractor. Very often such
losses occur without anyone's fault. A mine may be flooded, or a power failure may
occur by mischance as well as by negligence. Where it is only mischance, everyone
grumbles but puts up with it. No one dreams of bringing an action for damages. So also
when it occurs by negligence. The risk should be borne by the whole community rather
than on one pair of shoulders, i.e. on one contractor who may, or may not, be insured
against the risk. There is not much logic in this, but still it is the law.
SCM (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. W.J. Whitehall & Son Ltd., I Q.B. 137 (1970), available in LEXIS, UK
Library, ALLCAS File.
47 Whether a duty of care is owed in any particular instance is a question of law and "is the court's
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." Bigbee v. Pac. Telephone and Telegraph Co., 665 P.2d
947, 955 (1983). There are a number of such considerations:
the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy
of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to
the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and
the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Id.
48See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1316-24 (9th Cir. 1998); Mayo v.
Memminger, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13154 (N.D. Cal. 1998); GTE New Media Serv. v. Ameritech
Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 1998); Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson, 698 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998).
49 See Jeri Clausing, Administration Seeks Input on Privacy Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1998
(visited Feb. 27, 1999) <http:llwww.nytimes.comllibrary/tech/98/111eyber/articlesl06privacy.html>;
United States Department of Commerce, Electronic Commerce Task Force, Safe Harbor Principles
(Feb. 28, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.govlecom/menu.htm>; see also Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in
Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1193 (1998) (discussing use of private data in cyberspace).
See generally European Union Data Protection Directive (visited Feb. 25, 1999) <http://www2.echo.lu/
legallenldataprot/directiv/directiv.html> (outlining protection requirements with regard to processing
and moving an individual's personal information). See, e.g., Craig Bicknell, For Sale: Your Tastes,
Interests, WIRED NEws, June 24, 1998, (visited Feb. 25, 1999) <http://www.wired.com/news
print.version/business/story/13212.html> (discussing how companies are using individual tastes and
interests to sell products).
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personalization. Interactivity brings targeting, and targeting bespeaks foreseeability.
From the perspective of the health care provider's database, the potential plaintiffs
are not undifferentiated, the drug-interactions are not unidentified and the symptoms
or individuated risks are not unknown. In short, Cardozo's "indeterminate class" is
no longer an anonymous undifferentiated one.
III. HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND WEB-BASED BUSINESS MODELS
The Internet (and, in its footsteps, the web) originated as a communications
medium, 5 0 mixing in scientific, educational and alternative cultures, to become a
nascent community medium. Currently the web, fueled by rapidly evolving techno-
logical innovations, is in the process of evolving into a mass medium dominated by
characteristics adapted from entertainment, marketing and retailing cultures and
media. These tendencies will be confirmed and then accelerated by the growth of
broadband access, 5 1 the adoption of Internet protocol5 2 as the universal transport for
all data, including telephony and video, and the convergence of web and existing
media.
Business models for the web 53 have been difficult to define and implement, in
part because enthusiastic early adopters of this content-rich environment have
steadfastly refused to pay for pure data or information, often referred to as soft, web-
based content.5 4 In contrast, consumers have shown themselves increasingly willing
to purchase some hard goods from the web. Established or bricks and mortar
retailersSS are engaged in a brutal struggle with web upstarts,5 6 particularly in areas
of easily shipped goods, such as books, videos and compact discs (CDs). Outside of
web retailing of traditional hard goods (e.g., books or CDs) business models seem
less focused. Entrepreneurial activity (including preparing the business for an initial
public offering (IPO)) is frequently frantic, even schizophrenic, dominated more by
branding, presence and cross-marketing than by real space business fundamentals
such as revenue streams.57
Media companies generally seem to be concentrating on content leveraging and
50 See John Schwartz, Gore Deserves Internet Credit, Some Say: Online Experts Call Vice
President's Efforts 'Instrumental' to Current System, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1999, at A4.
51 Broadband access permits several channels of information to be offered through a single
medium. See Webopaedia (visited Mar. 22, 1999) <http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/b/
broadband transmission.html>. Currently, broadband access is being touted by MediaOne as being
capable of-delivering "Superior Television Entertainment," "High Speed Internet Access" and "Digital
Telephone Service" over its cable lines. See MediaOne Products and Services (visited Mar. 28, 1999)
<http://www.mediaone.comlproductsservices/default.htm>.
52 Internet protocol (IP) specifies both how data, to be sent from point A to point B, is to be
formatted and how point A and point B are to be assigned addresses. See Webopaedla (visited Mar. 22,
1999) <http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/I/IP.html>.
53 See generally Maureen O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World,
82 MINN. L. REv. 609, 624-30 (1998) (discussing how current laws should be applied to the Internet).
54 Data warehouses, such as Lexis-Nexis®, are not exceptions to the rule against charging for
content as their markets were established prior to permitting web access. Notwithstanding, some
information providers and some media companies are moving to per byte or per slice models. See, e.g.,
WestDoc (visited Jan. 25, 1999) <http:llwww.westdoc.comlformslwdupdate.htm>; GoodNoise (visited
Jan. 25, 1999) <http://www.goodnoise.com>.
55 See, e.g., Barnes and Noble (visited Jan. 25, 1999) <http://www.barnesandnoble.com>.
56 See, e.g., Music Boulevard (visited Jan. 25, 1999) <http://www.musicblvd.com>; Amazon.com
(visited Jan. 25, 1999) <http://www.amazon.com>.
57 See Jonathan Weber, Is It What You Sell or How That Matters More?, L.A. TIMES, July 28,
1997, at D I.
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brand management.58 Meanwhile, businesses that provide services that are not, or
were not, consumer facing have embarked on ambitious web-based marketing plans
and the adoption of the latest targeting and personalization technologies.5 9 The
recognized verity for web-based business models in thick markets is that the web-
presence should be sticky; that is, a website should capture the loyalty of surfers so
that they return or designate the site as their home page, the marketer's ideal. 60 For a
site to be sticky, it must comply with the contemporary web marketers' mantra of
content, community and commerce. 61 Clearly, health care providers are subscribing
to this approach, looking first at content and communities to make their sites sticky,
no doubt in preparation for more explicitly commercial activities.
In the first few years of its existence, the web's most innovative business model
has been the portal.62 There are two portal models. The first and most obvious
model, and that chased by major media and computer businesses, revolves around
the provision by the portal site of a free service to web surfers, such as a search
engine63 or e-mail.64 Such portals then sell their own products, third-party products
and third-party advertising.6s The second type of portal model has community
elements, concentrating on particular web population subsets; they are known as
vertical portals.66 Obviously this model has considerable relevance to established
real space vertical markets such as law67 or health care.68
Although drug companies and MCOs clearly seek a portal presence, they are
also struggling with the targeting of their sites. Overall, provider websites fit within
one of two broad models: those directed at other professional or commercial
members of the vertical health market and those directed at consumer-patients. The
web already has more than 1500 listings for medical equipment,69 over 400 listings
5 8 See, e.g., MSNBC (visited Jan. 25, 1999) <http://www.msnbc.com>; see also Lisa Napoli,
Magazine Publishers Search for Place Online, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1998 (visited Feb..19, 1999)
<http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/10/cyber/articles/30magazine.html>.
59 See, e.g., BMG Music Service (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.bmgmusicservice.com>; see
also Stephanie Wilkinson, BMG Music Site is a Hit, PC WEEK ONLINE, OCL 4, 1998, (visited Feb. 16,
1999) <http://www.zdnet.com/pcwceklstoriesprintme/0,4235,357087,00.html>.
60 See generally Bob Tedeschi, Caught in a Web of 'Sticky'Services, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1998
(visited Mar. 28, 1999) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/10/cyber/artices/20commerce.html>
(discussing the efforts that companies make to retain web suffers).
61 See id.
62 See e.g., Rajiv Chandrackan, Today's Hot Web Concept is 'Portals', WASH. POST, Oct. 11,
1998, at H01 (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/washtech/daily/oct98/
portalsl0 198.htm>.
63 See, e.g., Yahoo! (visited Jan. 25, 1999) <http://www.yahoo.com>.
64 See, e.g., Hotmail (visited Feb. 25, 1999) <http://www.hotmaii.com>.
65 Third-party advertising typically appears as a banner on a portal site. These advertisements to
use the latest euphemism are called sponsored links. For a review of possible advertising models, see
Netmarketing, Business-to-Business Websites Top 200 (visited Feb. 25, 1999) <http://www.netb2b.com/
nm200> and Adresource (visited Feb. 25, 1999) <http://www.adresource.com/index.htnl>. Third
parties are extremely interested in learning how effective these sponsored links are so they can justify
the expense of them. See Craig Bicknell, Making Ads Hit Their Mark, WIRED NEws, Oct. 1998, (visited
Feb. 25, 1999) <http://www.wired.con/news/print-version/business/story/1 5707.html> (discussing how
Internet sites can track users for advertising purposes).
66 See, e.g., iVillage (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://www.ivillage.com> (focusing on women's
issues).
67 See, e.g., Counsel Connect (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://www.counsel.com>.
68 See, e.g., Physicians' Online® Network (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http:I/www.po.com >.
69 See Yahoo! (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http:lldir.yahoo.comlBusinessand.Economy/Companiesl
HealthlMedical..Equipment>.
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for medical suppliers, such as gloves, dental products, surgical instruments7 0 and
more than 4600 listings for medicine, generally specialties and subspecialties aimed
at professionals. 7' Of the sites that are more obviously aimed at consumer-patients,
the web has over 1000 listings for U.S. hospitals and medical centers,72 and more
than seventy listings for managed care providers.7 3 Surfers will also find over 1100
listings for pharmaceuticals, including manufacturers, 74 pharmacies and organiza-
tions seeking volunteers for clinical trials.7
Somewhat more difficult to classify are the more than 5000 listings for
individual diseases and conditions,76 and the more than 400 listings on specific
drugs.7 7 Take just the obvious example of Viagra sites listed by Yahoo 78 Of the
sites, one is the official Viagra site79 run by the manufacturer Pfizer, Inc. In
addition, however, you will find the apparently commercial Viagra Resource Site8 O
that offers Viagra information and links to what appear to be online doctors and
pharmacies. The Yahoo! link also takes you to Viagra Talk,8l which is hosted by a
physician who is also a broadcaster and an author.
Taking into account the various cyber-malpractice themes that will lead the
debate and the large number of provider liability business models, this Article now
concentrates on three emergent tendencies in cybermedicine to illustrate these
liability themes. As noted earlier, these trends are web-based marketing by health
care institutions, particularly hospitals and MCOs, web-based marketing and product
support by pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the proliferation of health-oriented
advice sites. Throughout this Article, the concentration is on relative threshold
issues such as whether a plaintiffs claim would survive a motion to dismiss or
summary judgment, leaving more granular issues such as the content of the duty of
care for later analysis.
IV. WEB-MARKETING AND INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY
In recent years, a much clearer picture of real space institutional provider
liability in malpractice cases has emerged.8 2 However, some areas of the picture still
70See Yahoo! (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://dir.yahoo.com/Business and Economy/Companies/
Health/MedicalSupplies>.
71 See Yahoo! (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://www.yahoo.com/lHealth/Medicine>.
72 See Yahoo! (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://dir.yahoo.com/Business.and.Economy/Companies/
HealthlHospitals andMedicalCenters>.
73 See Yahoo! (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://dir.yahoo.comlBusiness-andEconomy/Companicsl
FinancialServices/Insuance/Heath/ManagedCare__Providers>.
74 For a listing of the web addresses of the leading drug manufacturers, see Pharmaceutical
Companies on the World Wide Web (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http:l/members.aol.comlpharminf/
phlistl.html>.
75 See Yahoo! (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http:l/dir.yahoo.com/Business-and-Economy/Companies/
Health/Pharmaceuticals>.
76 See Yahoo! (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://dir.yahoo.com/Health/Diseases..and. .Conditions>.
77 See Yahoo! (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http:l/dir.yahoo.comlHealthlPharmacy/
Drugs.and Medications/Specific..Drugs.and_Medications>.
78 See Yahoo! (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://dir.yahoo.comlHealthlPharmacy/
Drugsand_Medications/Specific..Drugs, and Medications/Viagra..Sildenafil>.
79 See Viagra (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://www.viagra.com>.
80 See Viagra Resource Site (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://www.globalite.condviagra.html>.
81 See Viagra Talk (visited Jan. 16, 1999) <http://www.bigv.com>.
82 See, e.g., Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethinking
Liability, 31 GA. L. REv. 419, 509 (1997) (discussing developments in enterprise liability); Clark C.
Havinghurst, Making Health Plans Accountable for the Quality of Care, 31 GA. L. REV. 587, 647
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remain opaque. For example, questions remain as to the extent of common lawS3 or
statutoryS4 liability of MCOs with regard to the decision to approve or disapprove of
particular medical treatments. In addition, the exact interface between institutional
MCO liability and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) remains
an area of difficulty.8 5 However, what has become clear is that an institution's
marketing now plays a significant role in determining the extent of its indirect
institutional tort liability.8 6
There are an almost infinite number of web models available to shape an
institutional health care providers' web presence. Extant examples include simple
marketing and informational sites, 8 7 health maintenance organizations (HMOs)
exhibiting considerable levels of integration, 88 fully integrated managed care
systems89 and vertical portals serving multiple constituencies. 90 Clearly health care
institutions have discovered DTC or consumer-oriented marketing, which will have
serious liability exposure implications.
As is well known, the two traditional routes for imposing legal responsibility
on an institutional provider are indirect or vicarious liability and direct or corporate
liability.91 The latter is relatively uncontroversial in cases involving facilities,
(1997) (same); William M. Sage & James M. Jorling, A World That Won't Stand Still: Enterprise
Liability By Private Contract, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1007, 1043 (1994) (same); William M. Sage et al.,
Enterprise Liability For Medical Malpractice and Health Care Quality Improvement, 20 AM. J.L. &
MED. 1, 28 (1994) (same); see also Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability
and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REv. 381 (1994) (discussing the
history of enterprise liability).
83 See, e.g., Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a Health
Maintenance Organization's (HMO) denial of medical services created a federal cause of action); Wash.
Physicians Serv. v. Gregoire, 147 F.3d 1039, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) does not preempt Washington's Alternative Provider Statute,
which requires HMOs to cover several alternative medical treatment options); Andrews-Clarke v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 54-55 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that the insurance beneficiaries'
claims were preempted by ERISA, which does not authorize recovery for common law wrongful death
or personal injury caused by an improper refusal to authorize treatment); Robert Pear, Hands Tied,
Judges Rule Law That Limits H.M.O. Liability, N.Y. TiMES, July 11, 1998, at Al.
84 See Tax. Ctv. PRAc. & REM. CODE §§ 88.001-.003 (West 1997); D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-4526
(1998). See generally Carol Marie Cropper, In Texas, a Laboratory Test on the Effects of Suing
H.M.O.s, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1998, at C3 (discussing the numbers of lawsuits filed under a new
Texas law that allows suing HMOs for malpractice and discussing potential ERISA defenses); David
Schultz & Tracey Galinson, Suits Against Managed Care Providers May Elude ERISA, NAT'L L.J., July
6, 1998, at B9, available in WL 7/6198 Nat'l L.J. B9, (col. 2) (discussing ERISA's preemptive effects
on medical malpractice lawsuits for wrongful denial of benefits).
85 See Moscovitch v. Physicians Health Services, 24 F. Supp. 2d 74, 80 (D. Conn 1998) (holding
that ERISA did not completely preempt HMO participant's claims against the medical plan
administrator); see also HMOs Can Be Sued in Connecticut, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 9, 1998, at A8, available
in WL 11/9/98 Nat'l L.J. A8, (col. 1) (discussing Moscovitch and noting that an HMO may be liable for
quality of care rather than denial of benefits).
86See Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that
because HMO advertising caused the consumer to reasonably conclude that the physicians were HMO
employees and caused consumers to select the HMO rather than the individual physician, the HMO
could be held liable for the physician's negligence).
87 See Catholic Health Care West (visited Feb. 2, 1999) <http://www.chw.edu>.
88 See Kaiser Permanente Welcome (visited Feb. 2, 1999) <http://www.scl.ncal.kaiperm.org>.
89 See Welcome to Allina Health System (visited Jan. 26, 1999) <http://www.allina.com>. Cf
Community Hospital of Los Gatos (visited Jan. 26, 1999) <http://www.tenethealth.com/LosGatos>
(referring to "our physicians" but only providing a physician referral service).
90 See Oxford Health Plans (visited Feb. 2, 1999) <http://www.oxhp.com>.
91 For a discussion of both vicarious and corporate liability for Managed Care Organizations
(MCOs) and hospitals, see BARRY R. FURROW et al., HEALTH LAW 289-331 (Hornbook Series, West
1995).
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equipment and maintenance of premises.92 However, the law is considerably less
settled in cases involving core medical care services.93 Questions remain both about
the reach of duty issues, such as its applicability to informed consent and to certain
types of plaintiffs, 94 and there is uncertainty about the liability trigger, whether it is
review or supervision.95
Today, the vicarious liability game is played out using a number of theories:
case-by-case ostensible agency; 96 agency-based on the right to control rather than
actual control;97 agency by estoppel;98 apparent authority/agency; 99 and nondele-
gable duty.OO Law professors, unlike their students, arguably would never have
tired of this messy arsenal of case-by-case reallocation tools. However, the courts
seem to have had enough. A growing number of courts have moved toward an
enterprise liability model that, given its conceptual underpinnings, utilizes a wide-
ranging representational theory, a theory driven by providers' chosen business
models.
Kashishian v. Port'Ot was the breakthrough case. In Kashishian, the plaintiff
argued that a hospital should be liable for the alleged negligence of a nonemployce
cardiologist.102 The plaintiff's doctrinal route was apparent agency, which, as has
been noted, is frequently used as a basis for institutional liability.103 Kashishian
expanded liability beyond narrow fact patterns, such as emergency rooms or
radiology departments and stressed the marketing endeavors of the institutional
defendant as key, stating:
Cases and commentaries on the doctrine invariably point to the recog-
92 See id. at 297-99, 301-05 (discussing corporate duties to properly select and retain medical
staff and maintain premises).
93 Core medical services can be defined as those services that compose the basic services offered
by a hospital such as obstetrics, cardiology and radiology. See Cheryl Clark, Fallbrook Hospital Deal
Spurs Recall Effort, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Sept. 9, 1997, at B4.
94 For a discussion of corporate negligence and a hospital's duty to protect third parties, such as
nonpatients, see Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1994). In Pedroza, the court refused to
impose corporate liability on a hospital that granted hospital privileges to a nonemployce physician who
allegedly harmed a patient in his private office, off the hospital premises. See id. at 172.
95 See Darling v. Charleston Community Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (I1. 1965) (representing
the emergence of corporate negligence and the duty to protect patients from medical staff negligence).
96 See Schlotfeldt v. Charter Hosp., 910 P.2d 271 (Nev. 1996) (representing the general rule in
vicarious liability doctrine that a doctor-hospital agency relationship must exist for the doctor's acts to
attribute liability to the hospital, and that the existence of the relationship, even an ostensible agency
relationship, is a question of fact for a jury); BARRY R. FURROW et al., HEALTH LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 240 (3d ed. West 1997).
9 7 See Berel v. HCA Health Serv. of Texas, Inc., 881 S.W.2d 21, 21 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (stating
the control test for vicarious corporate liability as "It is the right of control, not actual control, that gives
rise to a duty to see that the independent contractor performs his work in a safe manner").
98 See Sword v. NKC Hosp., Inc., 661 N.E.2d 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (exemplifying the
ostensible agency test for vicarious corporate liability, but also discussing agency by estoppel as
predicated on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267).
99 See Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987) (demonstrating the nondelegable duty rule
from agency law as applied to corporate negligence cases); Sword, 661 N.E.2d at 10; Francisco v.
Hartford Gynecological Ctr., Inc., No. CV92-0513841 S, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 521 (Mar. 1, 1994);
Houghland v. Grant, 891 P.2d 563 (1995).
100 See Jackson, 743 P.2d 1376; Beeck v. Tucson General Hasp., 500 P.2d 1153 (Ariz. 1972)
(discussing the inherent function test for vicarious corporate liability and the doctrine of nondelegable
duty).
101 481 N.W.2d 277 (Wis. 1992).
102 See id. at 278.
103 See supra note 99 (cases representing apparent agency as a basis for institutional liability).
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nition that hospitals increasingly hold themselves out to the public in
expensive advertising campaigns as offering and rendering quality
health care services. One need only pick up a daily newspaper to see
full and half page advertisements extolling the medical virtues of an
individual hospital and the quality health care that the hospital is
prepared to deliver in any number of medical areas. Modem hospitals
have spent billions of dollars marketing themselves, nurturing the
image with the consuming public that they are full-care modem health
facilities. All of these expenditures have but one purpose: to persuade
those in need of medical services to obtain those services at a specific
hospital. In essence, hospitals have become big business, competing
with each other for health care dollars. As the role of the modem
hospital has evolved, and as the image of the modem hospital has
evolved (much of it self-induced), so too has the law with respect to the
hospital's responsibility and liability towards those it successfully
beckons. Hospitals not only employ physicians, surgeons, nurses, and
other health care workers, they also appoint physicians and surgeons to
their hospital staffs as independent contractors. What is the responsi-
bility of hospitals when these independent contractors render negligent
health care? Can they escape liability for the rendering of negligent
health care in all instances simply because the person rendering the
care was an independent contractor, regardless of how hospitals held
themselves out to the consuming public, regardless of how the doctor
rendering the health care held himself or herself out to the consuming
public, and regardless of the perception created in the mind of the
consuming public? We think not. 104
In Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc.,105 the plaintiffs sought to use apparent agency
theory to hold an institution liable for the alleged negligence of a nonemployee
anesthesiologist. 106 The court refused to enter the morass of traditional apparent
agency case law or navigate the intricacies of either ostensible agency107 or agency
by estoppel.108 Instead, it showed a preference for a sui generis theory, as follows:
For a hospital to be held liable for the negligence of a health care
professional under the doctrine of apparent agency, a plaintiff must
show that the hospital acted or communicated directly or indirectly to a
patient in such a manner that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the health care professional who was alleged to be
104 Kashishian, 481 N.W.2d at 282 (footnote omitted).
105 661 N.E.2d 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
10 6 See id. at 12.
107 See id.
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for another which are
accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered for the employer or
by his servants, is subject to liability for physical harm caused by the negligence of the
contractor in supplying such services to the same extent as though the employer were
supplying them himself or by his servants.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965).
10 8 See Sword, 661 N.E.2d 10.
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby causes a third
person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to
liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the one
appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958).
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negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital, and that the
plaintiff justifiably acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital,
consistent with ordinary care and prudence.109
Applying that test, the Sword court reversed the defendant's summary judgment
holding in favor of the defendant, because of evidence drawn exclusively from the
defendant's external marketing, including brochures and comparative advertising.110
Finally, in Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc.,11 the plaintiff
sought to hold an HM0112 liable for the alleged negligence of two participating
independent contractor physicians, a primary care doctor and an ear, nose and throat
specialist.'" 3 The court found evidence that suggested elements of traditional control
over the physicians by the HIMO, including monitoring for substandard care and
capitation.'1 4 Crucially, however, the court referenced the HMO's member hand-
book statement which provides that the HMO would provide "all your healthcare
needs" and "comprehensive quality services."' Is
Of course, many jurisdictions continue to use a previous generation liability
model, such as the right to control, as the trigger for institutional liability.,1 6 Others
favor a position of institutional liability without resort to representational theories. 17
However, notwithstanding a particular state's doctrinal preference, the reality is that
a provider's web presence will frequently deliver a message at odds with that crafted
by its liability exposure managers, increasing its real world vulnerability. Liability-
attracting marketing does not have to be web-based. Yet, websites, because of the
109 Sword, 661 N.E.2d at 15 (footnote omitted).
110 See id. at 15-16.
111 696 N.E.2d 356 (IIl. App. 1998).
112 The HMO at issue was an independent practice association (IPA) model, where the HMO
contracts with independent medical groups to provide patient services, as opposed to a staff model,
where the HMO employs physicians directly to provide services. See id. at 359.
113 See id. at 358.
114 See id. at 362.
115 See id. at 359, 363. See also Sorrells v. Egleston, 474 S.E.2d 60, 61-63 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)
(reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the hospital because there was a genuine
question of material fact regarding whether the informed consent forms explicitly nolified the parents
that the physicians were not hospital employees); Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788,
794-96 (I1. 1993) (reversing summary judgment for the hospital because a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether the physician was an apparent agent of the hospital, where the hospital's
treatment consent form stated that he would be treated "by physicians and employees of the hospital");
Gragg v. Calandra, 696 N.E.2d 1282, 1287-88 (I1. App. 1998) (holding that a hospital can be held
liable for the negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, even when an agent commits
an-intentional tort while furthering the business of the principal); Dahan v. UHS of Bethesda, Inc., 692
N.E.2d 1303, 1307 (Ill. App. 1998) (finding the hospital liable for the acts of its agent physician where
the patient did not know the physician was an independent contractor).
116 See, e.g., Berel v. HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc., 881 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that a hospital's ability to override an independent physician's orders through utilization
review procedures raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding control). But cf. Chase v,
Independent Practice Ass'n, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 251 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that the IPA's
utilization review procedures and cost-containment clauses did not raise a genuine issue of fact
regarding control because the IPA did not have the right to hire or fire independent physicians, nor
could the IPA alter the physician's salaries, work schedules, or terms of employment).
1i1 Although no court has explicitly adopted enterprise liability for health care providers, some
courts have done so implicitly. See, e.g., Alden v. Providence Hosp., 382 F.2d 163, 166 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (noting that even though an independent physician may be in charge of the patient, the hospital
remains liable for the negligent acts of its employee physicians, nurses, interns, attendants or laboratory
staff). But see, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987) (rejecting enterprise liability, and
instead adopting apparent authority as the test for vicarious liability).
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low marginal cost of increasing the number of pages,' 18 or perhaps because they are
rendered sticky by content, tend to encourage far more elaborate and integrated
messages about the health services offered. Structural implications swiftly follow.
Provider web activity, much like other corporate marketing activity, will tend to
confirm the movement away from individual health provider liability, such as
physician liability, and secondary liability models, such as institutional liability
based on respondeat superior, to industrialized or institutional medicine's corporate
or enterprise liability.
V. DRUG MANUFACTURERS AND DIRECT MARKETING
The pharmaceutical industry has zealously adopted DTC advertising.'" 9 The
impetus came, of course, when the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) relaxedl 20
many of its marketing controls.121 While DTC legal literature is already quite
mature, it has, with a few exceptions, 22 concentrated on marketing through
118 Website advertising is less costly to produce than traditional media. See O'Rourke, supra note
53, at 629.
119 See Steven W. Kopp & Mary Jane Sheffet, The Effect of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of
Prescription Drugs on Retail Gross Margins: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy Implications, 16 J.
PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 270 (1997), available in LEXIS, Market Library, JPP&M file; The Name
Game, MED. AD. NEWS, Aug. 1, 1998, at 3, available in 1998 WL 10479236;-New Consumer
Campaigns, MED. AD. NEWS, Aug. 1, 1998, at 12, available in 1998 WL 10479241; The Preapproval
Edge; Pharmaceutical Firms Turn to Preapproval Advertising to Gain Market Edge, MED. AD. NEWS,
May 1, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 10478970; Warren R. Ross, How DTC Broke Advertising s
Berlin Wall; Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Pharmaceutical Products, MED. MARKETING &
MEDIA, June 1998, at 76; see also FDA Puts Stop to Schering-Plough 's TV Antihistamine Ads, MED.
INDUS. TODAY, Aug. 25, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, MEDTDY file the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) has expressed its concerns with DTC prescription drug advertising because the
Schering-Plough Corp. did not properly explain the side effects of its drug); Lilly s Drug Ad Guidelines
Praised by State Medical Group, MED. INDUS. TODAY, Mar. 30, 1998, available in LEXIS, News
Library, MEDTDY file (Eli Lilly & Co. became one of the first pharmaceutical companies to develop
guidelines to regulate how it advertises its prescription drugs).
120 See Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,314 (1996); Draft Guidance for Industry;
Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements; Availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,171 (1997). For the
FDA's own summary, see the PowerPoint slide show (visited Feb. 2, 1999) <http://www.fda.gov/cder
ddmac/DIAANNUAL.DTC.698.PPT>.
121 See generally Milton Liebman, FDA Takes the Mystery Out of TV Ads, MED. MARKETING &
MEDIA, Sept. 1997, at 34, 34 (noting that the FDA issued guidelines setting out a practical approach for
advertising prescription drugs, requiring a statement disclosing all major risks associated with the drug);
Marlene K. Tandy, Regulatory Affairs Perspective; FDA Attempt To Regulate Public Comments Carried
On The Internet Has Certain Limits; Commercial Speech On Devices Is OK, BIOMEDICAL MARKET
NEWSL., Jan. 25, 1997, available in LEXIS, Market Library, IACNWS File (arguing that the FDA
should be extraordinarily cautious before regulating medical device promotion and advertising because
of free speech concerns and suggesting instead that the FDA remain within the boundaries of the
statutory authority it has pursuant to the federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act); Tamar Nordenberg,
Direct To You: TV Drug Ads That Make Sense; Includes Related Articles on Pharmaceutical Products
Advertising on the Internet and Ad Regulations, FDA CONSUMER, Jan. 11, 1998, at 7, 7 (explaining that
DTC advertising does have beneficial purposes, however, it may mislead consumers because they do
not provide consumers with a complete picture of the drug).
122 See generally Peter S. Reichertz, Understanding Government Regulation of the Marketing and
Advertising of Medical Devices, Drugs, and Biologics: The Challenges of the Internet, 52 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 303 (1997) (reviewing FDA progress in determining how pharmaceutical companies can
market medical devices, drugs and biologics on the Internet); Marc J. Scheineson, Legal Overview of
Likely FDA Regulation ofInternet Promotion, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 697 (1996) (considering FDA and
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulation of Internet-based advertising, including use of interactive
graphics to manipulate and convey drug information); David W. Opderbeck, How Should FDA Regulate
Prescription Drug Promotion on the Internet?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 47 (1998) (addressing the history,
culture, technology and popular uses of the Internet, using model regulations presented at a 1996 FDA
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traditional media. 23 Meanwhile, attention in cyberspace, particularly that of the
popular press, has concentrated on shifts in pharmaceutical distribution, particularly
that of sildenafil citrate, or Viagra.124 Such direct sales implicate potential
regulatory and liability exposure of retailers, physicians and pharmacies; 25 trends
that will continue as online pharmacies proliferate. 126
Direct sales issues aside, cybermedicine, specifically DTC on the web, suggests
some far more radical shifts in pharmaceutical manufacturer exposure. 2? DTC
marketing has become common on television and in magazines. However, the
purpose of broadcast and print advertisements is to promote brand awareness. 28
These advertisements remain relatively shallow and light in content, and exist
primarily as pointers to health care professionals. 29 The most that a pharmaceutical
manufacturer can expect from these advertisements is to stimulate an office visit and
to skew any patient role in choosing between treatment modalities.130
In contrast, a pharmaceutical manufacturer's web presence, marketing and
consumer-patient interaction is far more robust and potentially insidious. 31 A
content-rich, interactive website threatens to replace much of physician-patient
dialog, leaving the professional in a more passive role. 32 As such the web-
marketing of pharmaceuticals must trigger a fundamental reassessment of key
conference on Internet content). See also Promotion of FDA-Regulated Medical Products on the
Internet; Notice of Public Meeting, 61 Fed. Reg. 48,707 (1996) (announcing an FDA sponsored public
meeting to discuss issues related to the promotion of FDA-regulated medical products on the Internet
with the purpose of guiding the FDA in policy decisions on the promotion of drugs on the Internet);
Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions 63 Fed. Reg. 61,680 (1998) (requiring
the semiannual publication of an agenda that summarizes current rulemakings of the Department of
Health and Human Services, including the emerging policy mandating more effective regulation of
drugs and medical products).
123 See, e.g., Michael C. Allen, Comment: Medicine Goes Madison Avenue: An Evaluation of the
Effect of Direct-To-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising on the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 20
CAMPBELL L. REv. 113 (1997) (examining and evaluating the learned intermediary doctrine with regard
to DTC advertising, focusing on an analysis of products liability principles); Teresa M. Schwartz,
Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising and the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 FOOD DRUG
COsM. L.J. 829 (1991) (concluding that courts will be unwilling to recognize a new liability-expanding
rule pertaining to increased advertising of prescription drugs to consumers); Lars Noah, Advertising
Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141
(1997) (analyzing regulation and liability consequences of drug companies' media campaigns to sell
more products). See also Lars Noah, Death of a Salesman: To What Extent Can the FDA Regulate the
Promotional Statements of Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives?, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.i. 309, 326,
334 (1992) (discussing FDA authority to control actions of pharmaceutical company "detail men").
124 See Rita Rubin, On-line Viagra worries medical boards, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 1999, at DI
(stating that as increasing numbers of websites offer "on-line consultations" for Viagra, medical
licensing officials are studying ways to stop them).
125 See Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557 (111. 1992) (holding that a pharmacist and
pharmacy were not negligent in warning of a drug's dangerous side effects).
126 See, e.g., CyberPharmacy, (visited Feb. 27, 1999) <http://www.cyberpharmacy.com>;
Drugstore.com (visited Feb. 27, 1999) <http://www.drugstore.com/index.html>. See generally Matt
Richtel, A Prescription for Success, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1999, at B10 (discussing the founders of
Drugstore.com); Bob Tedeschi, Want to Be an Online Drugstore? Take a Number, N.Y. TIMES ON THE
WEB, Feb. 2, 1999, (visited Mar. 28, 1999) <http:lwww.nytimes.comllibrary/tech/99/02/cyber/
commerce/02commerce.html> (showing the increasing popularity of online drugstore offerings); Net
Pharmacies Raise Abuse Fears, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 26, 1998, at 3C.
127 See Reichertz, supra note 122, at 304.
128 See Nordenberg, supra note 121, at 7.
129 See id.
130 See Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers, supra note 123, at 150.
131 See id. at 153-54.
132 See Allen, supra note 123, at 118-19.
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liability doctrines that, heretofore, have been premised on a limited level of
manufacturer-patient interaction.t 33 One possible liability scenario is of a drug
manufacturer's marketing overreaching into overpromotion, and essentially
nullifying otherwise adequate warnings.134 The more likely immediate scenario, and
the one this Article will concentrate on here, is the dismantling of the learned
intermediary doctrine.135
A. PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING ON THE WEB
The search engine Yahoo! offers more than 1200 listings for pharmaceutical
companies. 36 More discrete sources can link you directly to the 70 or so multi-
national pharmaceutical companies that have a web presence.137 As always, a
number of business models are being explored.138
Most major pharmaceutical companies have what are known as corporate
sites.139 A few companies have begun to work with vertical portals, a prime example
being the Pfizer site Exploring Your Health Online.140 The site itself notes: "Pfizer
is proud to bring you this friendly guide to researching health topics using the
Internet."14' The site contains a wealth of information for those seeking to find
health or disease information on the web. The site seems to studiously avoid direct
marketing or promotion of Pfizer products, although each page contains a link to the
Pfizer corporate site from which the user can navigate to individual product
information. It carefully precedes every external link with a disclaimer, "You are
now leaving www.pfizer.com/exploringhealth. Links to these outside sites are
provided as a resource to the viewer." 142
A particularly popular model is the consumer-oriented, product-specific site.
For example, the Schering-Plough Corporation website, 143 while including news
releases concerning the progress of drugs in the FDA regulatory process, directs
surfers to what it describes as product-related websites. The portal site for these is
the "Health Care Homepage, brought to you by Schering-Plough," with a separate
surfer-friendly uniform resource locator (URL).144 From the portal you can visit
various zones such as Allergy Relief or Skin Cancer, again each with distinct user-
friendly URLs.145 For example, the Skin Cancer site contains general health
133 See id. at 120.
134 See, e.g., Stevens v. Parke Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973) (finding a pharmaceutical
company liable for overpromotion of a drug).
135 See generally Allen, supra note 123 (discussing the effects of DTC pharmaceutical advertising
on the learned intermediary doctrine).
136 See Yahoo! (visited Jan. 26, 1999) <http:lldir.yahoo.com/Business and Economy/Companies/
Health>.
137 See Pharmaceutical Companies on the World Wide Web (visited Feb. 26, 1999)
<http://members.aol.com/pharminf/ph.listl .html>.
138 See generally Merck (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://www.merck.com> (containing aspects of
corporate, vertical portal and product-related advertising models).13 9 See supra note 137.
14 0 See Exploring Your Health Online (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http:llwww.pfizer.comlkpw/
explore>.
141 See id.
142 For example, from the Exploring Your Health Online site, if you choose the Viagra hyperlink,
you will be presented with the disclaimer. See External Link Page (visited Feb. 28, 1999)
<http:l/www.pflzer.com/kpw/explore/cgi-bin/xink/nph-xink.cgi?link=-http://www.pfizer.com>.
143 See Welcome to Schering Plough! (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.sch-plough.com>.
144 See Health Care Homepage (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.myhealth.com>.
145 See Welcome to Claritin.Com (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.allergy-relief.com>;
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information such as a Guide to Sun Safety, 146 but primarily provides information for
potential or current users of the Schering-Plough prescription drug Intron. Similarly,
although the Allergy Relief zone contains general consumer-oriented information
such as Learn About Allergies!,147 its primary purpose appears to be marketing and
supporting the Schering-Plough prescription drug Claritin family.148
Software companies once placed their documentation in manuals shipped with
their software and provided customer assistance through telephony-based support.
Today, both documentation and support are provided via the web. In the case of
drug companies, consider again the Schering-Plough Allergy Relief zone discussed
above.149 Of most interest are the patient package inserts (PPIs),1S0 or patient inserts
(PIs), on this site.15 1 In fact, across all manufacturers' sites, the surfer can now
expect to find full prescribing information for most heavily marketed prescription
drugs.I5 2
B. DOWNLOADING DTC INTO THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE
As previously noted, the contemporary learned intermediary doctrine operates
to immunize drug manufacturers facing failure to warn products liability theory.153
Modem DTC marketing, particularly web marketing, threatens this immunity. The
learned intermediary doctrine is premised on the idea that the consumer of a
prescriptiont5 4 drug, rather than the provider's patient, is in reality the prescribing
health care provider. According to this theory, any warning duties owed by the
manufacturer are owed exclusively to the provider. Once applied, the doctrine
operates as an immunity because its practical effect is to deny the consumer-patient a
product warning claim against the manufacturer. The implication is that the patient
must establish a failure to warn or lack of informed consent against the prescribing
physician, suits with a relatively low rate of recovery compared with product
Welcome to the Skin Cancer Zone! (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.skin-cancer.com/index.htm>.
From Welcome to the Skin Cancer Zone!, one can access the consumer-oriented page, see Skin Cancer-
Consumer Zone (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http:llwww.skin.cancer.comlconsumer/con-indx.htm>.
146 See Skin Cancer-Guide to Sun Safety (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.skin-canccrcoml
consumer/sun sfty/guide/guide.htm>.
147 See Welcome to Claritin.Com (visited Jan. 26, 1999) <http://www.ailergy-relief.comlcarn/
index.htm>.
148 See Welcome to Claritin.Com (visited Jan. 26, 1999) <http:llwww.allergy-relief.comlinfo/
index.htm>.
149 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
150 See McKee v. American Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045 (1989), stating:
In 1980, the FDA adopted regulations requiring patient package inserts (PPI) directed to
the consumer. These were information leaflets, in lay language, to be produced by
manufacturers and distributed by pharmacists at the time a prescription was filled. 40
Fed. Reg. 60,754 (1980). This program was rescinded, however, in 1982. 47 Fed. Reg.
39,147 (1982). Patient inserts are still required for oral contraceptives and several other
drugs ....
782 P.2d at 1055.
151 See Welcome to Claritin.Com (visited Feb. 25, 1999) <http://www.allergy-
relief.com/pi/index.htm>. Patient inserts are also available for the medication Viagra, see Vlagra
(visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http:llwww.viagra.com/hcp/pro..pack-insert.htm>.
152 See Celebrex (visited Jan. 26, 1999) <http://www.celebrex.com/pi.htm> (manufactured by
Pfizer Inc.).
153 See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
416 F.2d 417, 426 (2nd Cir. 1969); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21, 23 (Okla. 1982); Terhune v. A.H.
Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 977 (Wash. 1978).
154 A different rule pertains to over-the-counter products. See Torsiello v. Whitehall Lab., 398
A.2d 132, 136 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
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liability claims.155 As the court in Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 56
noted:
The rationale behind these holdings is that the physician stands
between the manufacturer and the patient as a learned intermediary.
The physician has the duty to know the patient's condition as well as
the qualities and characteristics of the drugs or products to be
prescribed for the patient's use. The physician is in the best position,
therefore, to balance the needs of patients against the risks and benefits
of a particular drug or therapy, and then to supervise its use. 157
Three interconnected rationales are captured by the Tracy court's statement.
First, there is a physician or learned intermediary.158  Second, the learned
intermediary is in "the best position to balance the needs of patients against the risks
and benefits" of the drug.159 Third, any such learned intermediary in reality is
standing "between the manufacturer and the patient."160 The generally accepted
exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine have developed from negating the
second or third rationales. Indeed, the most widely accepted exception is based on
the correlate to the first premise, there was no intermediary or at least no learned
intermediary: a scenario commonly noted in mass immunization cases. t6t
The next most familiar, albeit patchily recognized,162 exception to the
application of the learned intermediary doctrine is based on the correlate to the
second rational. 63 Thus, where the setting for the drug's distribution essentially
negates the possibility for individualized risk-benefit analysis by the drug dispenser,
the learned intermediary, the warning should be issued directly to the patient. The
155 There may be other variants if the information proves lacking. See Washington State
Physicians Insurance Exchange & Assoc. v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1993) (describing a
case where a physician brought an action against a pharmaceutical manufacturer for allegedly failing to
warn him about a possible adverse reaction to the drug by his patient).
156 569 N.E.2d 875 (Ohio 1991).
157 See id. at 878. Later the court also noted: "The learned intermediary doctrine achieves a
proper allocation of responsibility since not all patients are alike and it is the physician who best knows
the patient." Id. "[C]hoice ... [of the learned intermediary] is an informed one, an individualized
medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and palliative." Reyes v. Wyeth Labs, 498
F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974).
158 Tracy, 569 N.E.2d at 878.
159 Id.
160 See id.
161 See Brazzell v. United States, 788 F.2d 1352, 1357 (8th Cir. 1986). See also Mazur v. Merck
& Co., Inc., 964 F.2d 1348, 1355 (3d Cir. 1992). The mass immunization exception is better thought of
as one context where a prescription drug manufacturer is obligated to warn users directly of the facts
that make its product dangerous. See id. at 1355. That is, it restores the prescription drug manu-
facturer's duty to warn users directly, which is satisfied indirectly where the prescription drug
manufacturer provides an adequate warning to a learned intermediary, because the rationale supporting
the learned intermediary rule buckles where prescription drugs are dispensed without an individualized
medical balancing of the risks and benefits to the user. See id.
162 See West v. G.D. Searle & Co., 879 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Ark. 1994), holding that:
The applicable Food and Drug Administration regulation requires a manufacturer to ship
a leaflet or pamphlet to the dispenser which fully informs the patient of the benefits and
risks involved in the use of oral contraceptives .... The duty imposed on Searle was to
include this information, using the language required by the Food and Drug
Administration, when it shipped the product to the dispenser.
Id. (emphasis in original)
163 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 cmt. e (1998) (stating the rationale for this exception
is that "warnings should be given directly to patients when government regulations so require.").
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classic example of this exception's application is the oral contraceptive. 164 In such a
case, any risk-utility analysis undertaken should require the processing of informa-
tion that is split between the provider and the patient. For example, a likely scenario
would be that the physician has information about the patient's health and
pharmacology, while the patient has information about social, sexual and personal
choices.165 In MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,166 the court noted:
The oral contraceptive thus stands apart from other prescription drugs
in light of the heightened participation of patients in decisions relating
to use of "the pill"; the substantial risks affiliated with the product's
use; the feasibility of direct warnings by the manufacturer to the user;
the limited participation of the physician (annual prescriptions); and
the possibility that oral communications between physicians and
consumers may be insufficient or too scanty standing alone fully to
apprise consumers of the product's dangers at the time the initial
selection of a contraceptive method is made as well as at subsequent
points when alternative methods may be considered. We conclude that
the manufacturer of oral contraceptives is not justified in relying on
warnings to the medical profession to satisfy its common law duty to
warn, and that the manufacturer's obligation encompasses a duty to
warn the ultimate user. Thus, the manufacturer's duty is to provide to
the consumer written warnings conveying reasonable notice of the
nature, gravity, and likelihood of known or knowable side effects, and
advising the consumer to seek fuller explanation from the prescribing
physician or other doctor of any such information of concern to the
consumer. 16 7
Overall, this seems to be a sounder rationale for these exceptional cases than
government-mandated communication of the patient information, the PI or PPI,
directly to the patient. 168
In contrast, in a web-marketing type of case, the correlate to the third rationale
should be scrutinized-that there is no learned intermediary standing between the
manufacturer and the patient.169 Recall Mazur v. Merck & Co.,170 where the court
refused to apply the learned intermediary rule because the manufacturer had foreseen
a mass immunization scenario. As the Mazur court noted "Prescription drug manu-
facturers are charged with knowledge of the distribution system in which their
products are sold."' 7 ' In a direct web-marketing scenario, the same reasoning as in
164 See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985). In MacDonald, the court
held that: (I) a manufacturer of oral contraceptives owes direct duty to a user to warn of dangers
inherent in use of contraceptives; and (2) a manufacturer's compliance with FDA guidelines does not
necessarily shield it from liability for failing to provide adequate warnings. Id. at 65-66.
165 See Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989); Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032
(Kan. 1990); see also MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 69 (finding that "the healthy, young consumer of oral
contraceptives is usually actively involved in the decision to use 'the pill"'); Odgers v. Ortho Pharm,
Corp., 609 F. Supp 867, 878 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (finding that "a patient does not rely on the physician to
nearly the same degree when it comes to choosing a method of contraception as in a decision regarding
a therapeutic drug").
166 475 N.E.2d 65.
167 Id. at 70.
168 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, § 6 cmt. e.
169 See Mazur v. Merck & Co., 964 F.2d 1348, 1356 (3d Cir. 1992).
170 964 F.2d 1348 (3d Cir. 1992).
171 Id. at 1363.
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Mazur should apply. By providing decision-related information, the web-marketing
manufacturer has purposefully, or at least foreseeably, circumvented the learned
intermediary who, consequently, is distanced from the patient's decision-making
processes.
While the exact issue has not come up for decision, 172 a series of judicial
comments seem to support the position that direct web-marketing may negate the
Learned Intermediary doctrine. Take, for example, Tracy,173 wherein the plaintiff
made the argument, albeit a losing one, that the physician was acting as an agent for
the manufacturer rather than a true learned intermediary.174 A comment by the
Tracy court, in response to the plaintiff s argument that the learned intermediary was
not applicable to investigational drugs, is telling:
Typically, prescription drugs (whether FDA approved or in the
investigational study phase) do not come to the patient in retail
containers with full warning enclosures. Whether the drug is under
investigation or FDA approved, it is the physician who selects it as
appropriate for the patient. It is the physician who has the contact and
relationship with the patient.175
A similar theme runs through the intrauterine device (IUD) case of Hill v.
Searle Laboratories.176 The court stated:
Applying this test to the instant facts, we believe that IUDs, like other
forms of birth control, are atypical from most prescription drug
products because the treating physician generally does not make an
intervening, individualized medical judgment in the birth control
decision. Typically, the physician makes the decision of whether a
particular treatment is necessary and desirable. In the case of birth
control, however, the patient makes an independent decision as to
whether she desires a prescription drug for birth control, and if so,
which method she prefers, with only limited input from the prescribing
physician. Several factors explain this reversal of roles. First, birth
control is a private and personal matter involving a decision that is
often dependent on factors to which the physician is not privy. In
many cases, the patient makes her choice based on effectiveness,
convenience or cost, rather than medical necessity. While a physician
may recommend one method over another, the final choice remains
that of the woman. Second, [defendant manufacturer] marketed the
product with the idea of convincing women to choose the CU-7.
Furthermore, beyond the initial treatment, there is little to no contact
between the physician and the patient regarding the choice and the risks
of using IUDs .... Recognizing that these factors limit the role that a
172 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 955 F. Supp 700 (E.D. Tex. 1997)
(arguing unsuccessfully that direct web marketing may negate the learned intermediary doctrine) afftd,
165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that Texas' learned intermediary doctrine precludes manufacturer
liability).
173 569 N.E.2d 875 (Ohio 1991).
174 See id. at 879; see also Lars Noah, Death of a Salesman, supra note 123, at 310-12 (noting
that information provided by pharmaceutical sales personnel "has the most significant impact on
doctors' prescribing habits, outweighing the effects of post-graduate education, advertising, journal
articles and direct mailings").
175 Tracy, 569 N.E.2d at 880 (emphasis added).
176 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
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physician plays in determining the necessity and desirability of birth
control, and the fact that physicians are inundated with information
about various prescription drug products, we think that in the case of
IUDs, prescribing physicians do not make an individualized medical
judgment. Thus, Hill's treating physician was not an intervening party
between herself and Searle. It was feasible to warn Hill. Moreover,
such warning is required by FDA regulation. Therefore, the trial court
erred in applying the learned intermediary rule to the facts of this
case.177
A duty to adequately warn the patient directly, the, inapplicability of learned
intermediary, is also supported by the Third Restatement of Torts.t 78 It states:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe because of
inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or
warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to: ...
(2) the patient when the m'anufacturer knows or has reason to know
that health care providers will not be in a position to reduce the risks
of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings.179
Finally, additional support for the proposition that direct marketing practices
significantly undercut traditional defense arguments can be drawn from the words of
a New Jersey court discussing the liability of a nonprescription drug manufacturer:
[W]e perceive the rule applicable to over-the-counter drugs as
requiring the consumer to be adequately warned by the manufacturer of
all known specific and appreciable inherent product dangers so that he
can protect. himself from the risks of use whether or not he consults a
physician, and this is precisely because he is likely to use an over-the-
counter product based on his own judgment, molded by advertising,
and without ever consulting a physician at all. The point, of course, is
that while the distinction in basic marketing techniques between
prescription and nonprescription drugs supports a dichotomy as to who
in each case must receive the warning, it does not support a dichotomy
as to the nature or function of the warning, whether to physician or
layman. The physician obviously must be sufficiently warned so that
he may prescribe medication after intelligently evaluating its benefits
and risks. A consumer of over-the-counter drugs is, as it were, self-
prescribing and is intended, expected, and indeed encouraged by the
drug- industry to do so. He must, therefore, also be given such
information by the manufacturer as will permit him to self-prescribe
with a minimum of risk.180
177 Id. at 1070-71 (footnotes and citation omitted); cf. In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab.
Litig., 165 F.3d at 379 (finding that physicians play a significant role in prescribing Norplant and in
educating patients about its use, therefore the learned intermediary doctrine is still applicable); see also
In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 955 F. Supp 700 (containing arguments from earlier
proceedings where the plaintiffs' argument that DTC promotion undercuts the rationale of the learned
intermediary doctrine and estops defendants from relying on the intermediary as an independent cause
and from asserting such a defense was not considered on the merits). But see Humes v. Clinton, 792
P.2d 1032 (1990) (holding that the learned intermediary doctrine relieves manufacturer of intrauterine
device (IUD) of duty to warn patients of risks involved).
17 8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, § 6(d).
17 9 Id. (emphasis added).
18 0 Torsiello v. Whitehall Labs., 398 A.2d 132, 139-40 (N.J. 1979).
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VI. UNCHARTED WATERS: ADVICE AND CONTENT SITES
There is some substance to the argument that many of the web-based marketing
activities of health care institutions and pharmaceutical manufacturers merely replicate
real space models. Many such activities are little more than media translations of
existing marketing practices, some no more than a print brochure or DTC copy
already contemplated by industry regulators are now mounted on a website.18 1
There can be no debate, however, that with emergent advice and content sites the
web is truly innovating and creating a phenomenon with considerable disanalogies to
real world marketing. Not surprisingly, such sites hold the potential for some of the
most difficult legal issues. 82
Needless to say, within the care or treatment advice and content genre, there are
several interesting models with possible legally significant differences. For
example, the pure marketing or contact model suggests that a physician-patient
relationship will be created prior to advice, diagnosis or treatment. As such, the web
is arguably merely being used for marketing, and real space malpractice law can be
applied to issues that follow consummation of the physician-patient relationship.
Take as an example CyberDocs,183 where "the doctor is always in," and which
describes itself as "the premiere Internet site for providing 'live' patient care on the
World Wide Web."184 As the service notes:
With CyberDocs, you can consult a physician from the convenience of
your own home, from anywhere in the world!
U.S. trained, board-certified CyberDocs are available in various
specialties, depending on your geographic locale, and are available by
appointment, to address your medical needs via interactive keyboard
chat and/or audiovideoconferencing.18 5
Of course, even with this model, there will be interesting representation, even
warranty issues surrounding the marketing context. Equally, various standard of
care, not to mention jurisdictional, issues will arise regarding such "keyboard"
medicine. Where the web opens up unique issues, however, is in the provision of
medical content that does not flow from a colorable physician-patient relationship-
a context that in cyberspace maps to advice, 86 chat'87 or diagnosis'SS sites.18 9 As
181 Of course, today's websites go far beyond any such transliteration. The technological aspects,
the interaction, targeting, personalization, etc., combined with the growing "stickiness' of such endeavors,
suggests that this is marketing of an altogether different quality, intensity, targeting and penetration.
182 There are already reports of serious problems with online advice. See, e.g., Let the Surfer
Beware, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 16, 1998, at 90; cf. Cyberdoctor Gets High Marks For His Pediatric Advice
On The Internet; Colleague Says Column Is An Asset To Parents And Physicians Alike, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 8, 1998, at C13 (highlighting the story of the highly successful Ask the Webdoctor site
that gives concerned parents pediatric health advice and information); see also Diane Jennings, Bitter
Pill to Swallow; 'Cybermedicine ' Simplicity has Fans but Raises Concerns, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Nov. 6, 1998, at IA (emphasizing both the popularity of cybermedicine, and the problem of patients
relying on medical advice from physicians they have never met); Docs Explore whether Online
Medicine is Good Medicine, supra note 27.
183 Cyberdocs (visited Mar. 5, 1999) <http://www.cyberdocs.com:>. See generally Cybermedicine
seen as unhealthy by some; Concerns voiced over diagnosing ills, prescribing medicine on 'Net,
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 1998, at CI (specifically discussing Cyberdocs, its practices and principles).
184 Cyberdocs (visited Mar. 5, 1999) <https://www.cyberdocs.com/sponsorship.htm>.
185 Id. (visited Jan. 25, 1999) <http://www.cyberdocs.con>.
186 See, e.g., Yahoo! (visited Mar. 5, 1998) <http://dir.yahoo.com/Health/Advice>.
187 See, e.g., Yahoo! (visited Mar. 5, 1998) <http://dir.yahoo.comlHealth/Chat>.
188 See, e.g., Yahoo! (visited Mar. 5, 1998) <http://dir.yahoo.com/Health/GeneralHealth>.
189 The web is also alive with physician screening services, advice sites aimed more at the
350 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 25 NOS. 2&3 1999
such, the primary focus of this section is to examine the potential liability of health
care providers, or apparent professional providers, who establish themselves in
cyberspace and thus attract cybercontact.
In what is still an immature area of web activity, there are some fascinating
technology or business models are being examined. For example, telemedical.com90
uses an extranet 9' model to link patients and physicians, patient records, products
and services. 192 Go Ask Alice!193 is an advice site operated by Columbia Univer-
sity's Health Education Program. It consists of an anonymous web forum providing
"factual, in-depth, straight-forward, and nonjudgmental information to assist readers'
decision-making about their physical, emotional, and spiritual health."194
Emedicine195 has corporate sponsors, including pharmaceutical and medical device
manufacturers, and promises "[flree online medical textbooks for physicians,
veterinariafis, medical students, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, nurses and
the public."196 Finally, consider Optum,197 a back-end provider of "health and well-
being support services" that health care providers can integrate into their products.198
Beyond these existing models, we will also see a myriad of new manifestations
of cybermedicine. These will include the simplest form of web content such as a
health-related "how to" web page, advice given by one nonprofessional participant
to another participant on a board/web-forum sponsored by an MCO or pharma-
ceutical manufacturer199 and the eventual provision of "professional" medical advice
by interactive wizards.200
Various liability fact patterns will fall out of these advice, chat and diagnosis
sites. Many will be preceded by the formation of a traditional physician-patient
relationship and are likely to attract real space analysis. Some will be "process"
complaints that examine the way the relationship was formed rather than,
necessarily, the quality of the care that resulted. 201  A small number, almost
industry, see Physician Profile Services (visited Nov. 8, 1998) <http'//dir.yahoo.com/Business-andEconomyl
Companies/Health/Providers/PhysicianProfileServices>.
190 (visited Feb. 6, 1999) <http://www.telemedical.com/Telemedical/library.html>.
191 "An extranet is a private network that uses the Interet protocols and the public
telecommunication system to securely share part of a business's information or operations with
suppliers, vendors, partners, customers, or other businesses." (visited Feb. 6, 1999)
<http://www.whatis.com/extranet.htm>.
192
The Cyberspace Telemedical Office is designed to be used by individuals, families,
communities, and healthcare professionals . . . . Guests are able to store up to 3.0
Megabytes of Their Personal Health Record and browse a growing list of healthcare
information and products. However, paying or sponsored members have access to
premium personalized services, publications, and online ordering of products.
Id. (visited Feb. 6, 1999) <http://www.telemedical.com/indexwb.htm>.
193 Go Ask Alice! (visited Feb. 6, 1999) <http://www.goaskalice.columbia.edu/about.html>.
194 See id.
195 Emedicine (visited Feb. 6, 1999) <http://www.emedicine.com/index.html>.
196 See id.
197 Opium (visited Feb. 6, 1999) <http://www.optumcare.com/index.html>.
198 Opium (visited Feb. 6, 1999) <http:llwww.optumcare.comlabout/overview/index.html>.
199 See Doctor's Guide (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http://www.docguide.com>.
200 See, e.g., the Condom Wizard at <http://www.condomania.com/cgi-bin/SoftCart.exe/catalog)
wizard/cwiz.shtml?L+condomania+aaaa5137>, part of the Condomania site (visited January 23, 1999)
<http://www.condomania.com>.
201 See, e.g., Bloskas v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907 (Colo. 1982). A physician recommended specific
surgery to a patient, falsely representing that he had performed the same operation on three other
patients and that all had had successful results. See id. at 910. In addition, he assured the patient that if
the surgery were unsuccessful, the patient should not worry about amputation. See id. Contrary to his
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inevitably, will involve antisocial conduct such as an intentional or fraudulent mis-
representation. 202 As the genre matures, the majority of cases, however, will involve
courts being asked to impose liability for nonintentional supply of poor quality
advice or content. Most cases will be brought utilizing negligence or negligent
misrepresentation theories. However, a few plaintiffs may seek a warranty or
products liability characterization.
In general, plaintiffs contemplating causes of action premised on substandard
cybermedical advice will have little to work with. Analogous real space, typically
print, cases involving claims for defective content generally have been
unsuccessful.203 However, some more successful claims have been brought on
warranty and products liability theories, albeit on facts that do not translate easily
into cyberspace.2 04
Negligence claims involving advice or content generally have stumbled at the
"duty" hurdle.2 05 Courts have had doubts as to the issue of causation and the burden
that an imposed duty would otherwise place on the defendant class. Regarding the
former, consider Roman v. New York, 206 holding that Planned Parenthood was not
liable for a misstatement in a pamphlet about contraception. 207 The court stated:
Not every negligent statement is actionable. A defendant will only be
held answerable where it is bound by some relational duty arising out
of a public calling, contract or other. This court need not decide
whether a relational duty would have existed if plaintiff Carmen
Roman had sought out Planned Parenthood's advice. She did not. The
evidence is clear and overwhelming that plaintiff sought the advice of
friends and relatives and relied on the knowledge of the physicians and
staff at Queens General Hospital. She did not go to defendant and
defendant did not contact her. Their sole relationship is her fortuitous
receipt of defendant's booklet at the hospital. That defendant pointedly
intended the booklet to provide information to the general public,
including plaintiff, and the fact that it could have reasonably foreseen
plaintiffs reliance thereon, does not change the result. One who
publishes a text cannot be said to assume liability for all
"misstatements," said or unsaid, to a potentially unlimited public for a
potentially unlimited period. Thus, the relational duty sufficient to
statement, the physician had never before personally performed this type of surgery. In reliance on
these statements, the patient consented to the surgery, but it proved unsuccessful, ultimately resulting in
amputation of the patient's foot. See id. at 909. The court rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the trial
court's instructional error led to the jury's rejection of his claim of malpractice based on a lack of
informed consent. See id. However, a majority of the court concluded that a claim for negligent
misrepresentation was not subsumed by plaintiff's malpractice claim and that the trial court erred in
refusing to submit such a claim for jury consideration. See id. at 914; see also Annotation, Medical
Malpractice: Liability Based on Misrepresentation of the Nature and Hazards of Treatment, 42
A.L.R.4th 543 (discussing negligent misrepresentation as a theory for relief).202 See Barden v. HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 41, 45 (D. Mass. 1994). To recover
for intentional fraudulent conduct, the plaintiff must prove that: "the defendant made a false
misrepresentation of a material fact with knowledge of its falsity for the purpose of inducing the
plaintiff to act thereon, and that the plaintiff relied upon the representation as true and acted upon it to
his damage." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ditmore, 729 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1984) (citing Barrett
Associates, Inc. v. Aronson, 190 N.E.2d 867, 868 (Mass. 1963).
203 See infra notes 207-31 and accompanying text.
204 See infra notes 239-51 and accompanying text.
205 See generally supra note 47.
206 Roman v. New York, 442 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
207 See id. at 948.
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give rise to a cause of action in negligent misrepresentation is not
present.208
In Bailey v. Huggins Diagnostic & Rehabilitation Center, Inc.,209 the plaintiff
had undertaken a course of extensive dental work principally for the removal of
amalgam fillings. This work was performed allegedly as a result of the plaintiff
reading the defendant's book in which he vigorously argued the minority
professional position that amalgam caused injuries such as muscular deficiencies. 210
The plaintiff also viewed a videotape of a local television documentary on the same
subject in which the defendant had appeared.2t'
Although the actual circumstances surrounding the plaintiffs receipt of
allegedly damaging information were somewhat more complex, the court framed the
issue as: "the question presented by this appeal is the extent to which an author or
interviewee on a public television program owes a legal duty of due care to those
members of the public who may read the book or view the program." 212 The court
then stated:
[E]ven if it be assumed that some harm might have been foreseeable,
we conclude that the social utility of encouraging authors to address
issues of public concern, and the magnitude of the burden that would
be imposed upon them if a duty of care were recognized, far outweigh
the private interest of any individual reader, at least in those instances,
as here, in which the published work implicates no illegal conduct.
The expression of opinions upon matters of public concern is the
core value protected by the First Amendment. To subject authors of
such opinions to the risk of multiple claims for personal injuries, at
least in those instances, as here, in which the opinions do not address
or impugn any specific individual, based solely upon the majoritarian
view that the opinion is "false," would impose an intolerable burden
upon the author of such opinions. And, the imposition of such a
burden would have a ruinous and unjustifiable chilling effect upon free
speech. 213
The defendant in Barden v. HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. 214 had published a
guide for victims of child sexual abuse. The book contained a list of attorneys who
could be consulted to assist victims. 215 The plaintiff, who read the book, complained
that one of the listed attorneys was credited with false qualifications; 216 said attorney
having failed to perform legal services for the plaintiff notwithstanding a paid
retainer.217 The plaintiffs action was premised on negligence. 218 The court granted
the defense motion for summary judgment,219 concluding:
20 8 Id. at 947-48.
209 Bailey v. Huggins Diagnostic & Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 952 P.2d 768 (Colo. App. 1997),
reh 'g denied (Colo. App. July 31, 1997), cert. denied (Colo. Feb. 23, 1998).
210 See id. at 770.
211 See id.
2 12 Id. at 772.
213 Id. at 773 (citation omitted).
214 Barden v. HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 41 (D. Mass. 1994).




219 See id. A similar fate befell the plaintiff's cause of action based on state deceptive trade
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Simply put, allowing the plaintiff to seek relief under a negligent
misrepresentation claim would open a pandora's [sic] box that might
be difficult to close. The burden placed upon publishers to check every
fact in the books they publish is both impractical and outside the realm
of their contemplated legal duties. Further, in the present case, it is
clear that the defendant did not assume the duty to investigate.220
Several other cases dealing with allegations of defective content also favor the
defense. However, the reasoning in these might have had more to do with the
particular type of defendant before the court rather than any general sense of
immunity in advice or content cases. For example, the Barden court relied in large
part on the leading case of Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons.221 Winter concerned The
Encyclopedia of Mushrooms, a reference guide containing information on the
habitat, collection and cooking of mushrooms.222 The plaintiffs alleged that some of
the information contained was erroneous or misleading, resulting in their
consumption of poisonous mushrooms.2 23 Although clearly a real space case, Winter
provides a near-perfect virtual space hypothetical. However, the Winter court's
reason for refusing to impose a duty of care on the defendant publisher was quite
narrowly drawn:
We conclude that the defendants have no duty to investigate the
accuracy of the contents of the books it publishes. A publisher may of
course assume such a burden, but there is nothing inherent in the role
of publisher or the surrounding legal doctrines to suggest that such a
duty should be imposed on publishers. Indeed the cases uniformly
refuse to impose such a duty. Were we tempted to create this duty, the
gentle tug of the First Amendment and the values embodied therein
would remind us of the social costs. 2 24
A similar result was reached in Jones v. JB. Lippincott C0.225 There, the
publishers of a nursing textbook were held not liable to a nursing student who
consulted their Textbook for Medical and Surgical Nursing, and treated herself for
constipation with a hydrogen peroxide enema.226 The court held:
Author liability for errors in the content of books, designs, or drawings
is not firmly defined and will depend on the nature of the publication,
on the intended audience, on causation in fact, and on the foreseeability
of damage. Publisher liability, on the other hand, has more clearly
defined principles and is therefore more easily determined. If a
publisher serves the function of publishing the contents of an author,
other than one of its own employees for whom it would be liable under
the doctrine of respondeat superior, it has no duty for the contents. 227
Winter, Jones and Barden suggest, therefore, that a website publishing its own
practices legislation.
220 Id. at 45.
221 Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
22 2 See id. at 1034.
22 3 See id.
224 Id. at 1037; see also Demuth Dev. Corp. v Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
(concerning an encyclopedia of chemicals and drugs).
225 Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Md. 1988).
22 6 See id. at 1216.
22 7 Id. at 1216-17 (citations omitted).
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advice or content rather than that of a third party, such as an author supplier, may
have some exposure relating to defective online content, a position that eerily
resonates with some cyberspace-specific doctrine.228 Even the more obviously pro-
defense cases, such as Roman and Bailey, are premised essentially on the plaintiff
being just one unidentified member of an undifferentiated pool of potential plaintiffs
or readers.229 Such a rationale may not be as helpful to a web defendant using highly
targeted marketing to specific plaintiffs identified via cookies 230 or site experience
personalization. 23 t
A few plaintiffs injured by information dressed up for a market, such as a book
sold through retail channels, have sought to characterize the information as a
product 232 and the liability allocation model 233 as products liability. 234 With some
interesting exceptions that do not map well to cyberspace, most of the cases
espousing a products, or products-analogous, theory have failed.235
228 See infra notes 296-303 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
230 Cookies are bits of information about users, stored on their computers' hard drives by
websites, that enable those websites to remember users and their preferences. See PC Webopedla
(visited Apr. 2, 1999) <www.webopedia.comlTERM/c/cookie.html>.
231
Personalization (sometimes called customization) generally refers to making a Web site
more responsive to the unique and individual needs of each user.
This can be accomplished in a number of ways, some of which require the user's
active involvement (typically through filling out a form or following a decision-tree set
of questions). Other approaches operate behind the scenes, without relying oft use
input-by using cookies, for example, or by looking at an IP address and serving up
content based on the user's browser.
Web Business-Personalizing your Web site-What is personalization? (visited May 19, 1999)
<http://www.builder.com/business/personal/sso l.html>.
232 Several fascinating issues beyond the scope of this Article arise. See Cardozo v. True, 342
So.2d 1053, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (distinguishing the tangible portion of the book, the
binding and printing, characterized a "good," from the thoughts and ideas contained therein).
233 See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Collapsing Torts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 717, 725-28 (1993)
(discussing the strict liability allocation model).
234 See generally Charles Walter & Thomas F. Marsteller, Liability for the Dissemination of
Defective Information, 30 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PROF'L COMM., Sept. 1987, at 164 (discussing the
requisite factors to prove a products liability claim). See also Pamela Samuelson, Liabilityfor Defective
Electronic Information, 36 COMM. ACM, Jan. 1993, at 21 (discussing the liability of software
developers if their software injures a user).
235
Further, appellant's rationale-that appellees are liable because the State (a third party)
relied on the publications to determine emission laws-is flawed. This reasoning is
faulty because any duty owed would not be to appellant, but to those who actually relied
on the work-in this case, the State.
Sinai v. Mitchell Books, No. 92-15442, 1993 WL 220260, at *1 (9th Cir. June 23, 1993) (Unpublished
Disposition).
See Yanase v. Automobile Club of S. Cal., 212 Cal. App. 3d 468, 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding publisher of a tour guide not liable to the plaintiff killed in the parking lot of motel listed in
guide); Walters v. Seventeen Magazine, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
magazine not liable to the plaintiff who suffered from toxic shock syndrome from advertised tampon);
Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., 662 F. Supp. 921, 922 (E.D. La. 1987) (holding the newspaper not liable
for printing a fraudulent advertisement); Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282, 282 (E.D. Mich. 1987)
(holding the defendant not liable because defendant merely printed, not created, a book); Demuth Dee.
Corp. v. Merck & Co., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 990, 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting summary judgment to
defendant who published a chemical encyclopedia which allegedly contained a misstatement of a
chemical's toxicity); Way v. Boy Scouts of America, 856 S.W.2d 230, 237 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding the magazine publisher not liable for the accidental shooting death of a 12-year old boy after
he had read a shooting sports supplement in the defendant's magazine). See also Garcia v. Kusan, Inc.,
655 N.E.2d 1290, 1290 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (holding the producer of a floor hockey game not liable
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A representative case is Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publications, Inc.,23 6
where the publisher of a travel guide was held to be under no duty to warn a reader
of dangerous ocean surf conditions at a beach resort.237 The court summed up the
national position as follows:
It appears from a review of relevant case law that no jurisdiction has
held a publisher liable in negligence for personal injury suffered in
reliance upon information contained in the publication, unless the
publisher authored or guaranteed the information. Whether based on
negligent misrepresentation or negligent manufacture of a defective
product, the cases uniformly hold, for the same policy reasons, that,
absent guaranteeing or authoring the contents of the publication, a
publisher has no duty to investigate and warn its readers of the
accuracy of the contents of its publications. 238
In opposition to the majority of cases refusing to apply product liability to
information, whether tangible or not, there is a narrow group of cases favoring
plaintiffs in cases concerning defective aeronautical charts. 239 These cases were
examined in Smith v. Linn,240 in which the publisher of a diet book entitled When
Everything Else Fails ... The Last Chance Diet was sued when a reader died of
complications arising from the liquid protein diet featured in the book. The plaintiff
brought a product liability action. 24 1 The plaintiff argued that the diet was a product,
and the book was a PI.242 The court concluded: "Instructions by a manufacturer
which accompany medication or use of certain marketed goods cannot be equated
with publication of books which espouse a writer's theory, opinions or ideology."243
In holding that strict products liability doctrine was not applicable to a book, the
court distinguished map and chart cases 244 as follows:
In those cases, extremely technical and detailed materials were
involved, upon which a limited class of persons imposed absolute trust
having reason to believe in their unqualified reliability. As such they
took on the attributes of a product and are not protected by the First
Amendment. 245
The most likely rationale for applying strict liability to an aeronautical chart is
that it operates as a surrogate for, or as the functional ,equivalent of, physical
to the plaintiff who was injured when struck in the eye by hockey stick during a gym class).
236 833 P.2d 70, 70 (Haw. 1992).
237 See id.
238 See id. at 75 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
239 See Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985); Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co.,
707 F.2d 671, 676-77 (2nd Cir. 1983) (classifying charts as defendant's products); Fluor Corp. v.
.Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 68 (Ct. App. 1985). See also Halstead v. United States, 535 F.
Supp. 782, 782 (D. Conn. 1982) (classifying navigational charts as products); Times Mirror Co. v. Sisk,
593 P.2d 924, 924 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that whether a navigational chart was unfit for
purposes and whether misrepresentations of the defendant about the chart were proximate causes of the
accident were jury questions).
240 563 A.2d 123, 126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
241 See id. The plaintiff's action was premised on Second Restatement of Torts sections 388 and
390. See id. The Smith court was dismissive of the plaintiff's arguments based on exceptions to the
First Amendment and a negligent publication argument. See id. at 125-26.
242 See id. at 126; see also supra note 150 (discussing PPIs).
243 Smith, 563 A.2d at 126.
244 See, e.g., Kercsmar v. Pen Argyl Area Sch. Dist., 1 Pa. D. & C.3d 1 (1976).
245 Smith, 563 A.2d at 127.
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products such as a compass, radar or navigational instrument.2 46 To phrase the
argument slightly differently, the information in chart cases goes beyond ideas or
expressions to a fixed representation or utilization of the same data.2 47 The Winter
court fleshed things out further:
The purposes served by products liability law ... are focused on the
tangible world and do not take into consideration the unique
characteristics of ideas and expression....
Although there is always some appeal to the involuntary spreading
of costs of injuries in any area, the costs in any comprehensive
cost/benefit analysis would be quite different were strict liability
concepts applied to words and ideas. We place a high priority on the
unfettered exchange of ideas. We accept the risk that words and ideas
have wings we cannot clip and which carry them we know not where.
The threat of liability without fault (financial responsibility for our
words and ideas in the absence of fault or a special undertaking or
responsibility) could seriously inhibit those who wish to share thoughts
and theories. As a New York court commented, with the specter of
strict liability, "[w]ould any author wish to be exposed.., for writing
on a topic which might result in physical injury? e.g. [sic] How to cut
trees; How to keep bees?" One might add: "Would anyone undertake
to guide by ideas expressed in words either a discrete group, a nation,
or humanity in general?" 248
Overall, the case law suggests that strict products liability is unlikely to be
applied to injuries sustained because of defects in web-based content. Of course,
one strain of products doctrine may be more obviously applicable. It should come as
little surprise that the publisher who expressly guarantees the accuracy of a piece of
information could attract liability. After all, such representational liability is premised
on the guarantee, the warranty, rather than the intrinsic quality of the underlying
product or service.249 In other words, while implied warranty claims will generally
be duplicative of process-oriented negligence claims or strict liability defect allega-
tions, a few bad content claims could be brought using express warranty doctrine, 25 0
essentially allegations of outcome warranty.25 1 However, as with many of the negli-
gence cases discussed above, the only case really on point was primarily concerned
with the potential liability of a publisher rather than the content creator, the author.
In Walters v. Seventeen Magazine,252 the plaintiff contracted toxic shock
syndrome allegedly as a result of using a tampon advertised in the defendant's
magazine. The court in affirming a dismissal noted, "Seventeen did not in any way
246 See Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991); Jones v. J.
Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (D. Md. 1988).
247 See Winter, 938 F.2d at 1036 (analogizing an aeronautical chart to a compass).
248 Id. at 1034-35 (citations omitted); accord Birmingham, 833 P.2d at 78.
249 See, e.g., Crocker v. Winthrop Labs, 514 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. 1974) (predicating a drug
manufacturer's liability on its misrepresentation that the drug was "free and safe from all dangers of
addiction").
250 See e.g., Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 189-90 (Mass. 1973) (holding that, in an
action by a professional entertainer against a surgeon for breach of a contract to improve the appearance
of the plaintiff's nose in two operations, the plaintiff was entitled to recover not only her out-of-pocket
expenses, but also for worsening of the appearance of her nose by the surgery and for pain and suffering
and mental distress involved in a third operation).
251 See id.
252 241 Cal. Rptr. 101 (Ct. App. 1987).
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sponsor or endorse products advertised in its pages. There was no representation of
quality, no promotional effort, and no attempt to induce the public to buy Playtex
tampons beyond merely printing the advertisement." 253
The Walters court also volunteered what could become something of a mantra
for web content providers when it stated:
In the absence of any cause of action supported by traditional theories,
we are loathe to create a new tort of negligently failing to investigate
the safety of an advertised product. Such a tort would require
publications to maintain huge staffs scrutinizing and testing each
product offered. The enormous cost of such groups, along with sky-
rocketing insurance rates, would deter many magazines from accepting
advertising, hastening their demise from lack of revenue. Others
would comply, but raise their prices beyond the reach of the average
reader. Still others would be wiped out by tort judgments, never to
revive. Soon the total number of publications in circulation would
drop dramatically.25 4
Cyberspace and its applicable doctrines are many years short of maturity, yet it
is not difficult to compose a tentative catalog of legal issues. It is difficult to believe
any of the early cases involving allegations of advice site liability not featuring
defense arguments as to First Amendment protection. Also inevitable will be
arguments that such speech should be characterized as commercial. 25 5 In addition,
First Amendment claims will be met by conventional counter arguments such as
defamation and fraud, 256 or speech directed to imminent lawless action.257 Similarly,
the exact relationship between First Amendment protection and the chilling effect of
253 Id. at 102. The court distinguished the leading case ofHanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr.
519 (Ct. App. 1969), by noting that unlike Good Housekeeping magazine in Hanberry, the defendant in
this case made no endorsement of a product's effectiveness. See Walters, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 102; see
also McCollum v. Friendly Hills Travel Ctr., 217 Cal. Rptr. 919 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the
defendant did not make any express or implied warranties regarding the safety of water skiing
equipment by just telling the plaintiff of the availability of such equipment).
254 Walters, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03.
255 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 n.4 (1985)
(discussing the reduced First Amendment protection that commercial speech receives); see also Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) (finding a lawyer's solicitation of business to be
unprotected commercial speech). For health-related cases, see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770-73 (1976) (protecting a pharmacist's
advertisement of drug prices, even though a state statute authorized revocation of licenses of clinical
laboratories that advertised); Metpath Inc. v. Myers, 462 F. Supp. 1104, 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (finding
a First Amendment violation where a state statute authorized revocation of licenses of clinical
laboratories that advertised). See also Missouri Dental Bd. v. Alexander, 628 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1982)
(issue not reached). For a content-tort liability type case, see Hustler, 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987)
cert. denied, the Fifth Circuit apparently viewed a mere "promotional device" as commercial speech in
contrast with content disseminated for profit (814 F.2d at 1024) that could still qualify as
noncommercial speech.
256 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (alleging that the defendant's
advertisements were fraudulent and deceptive); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
(alleging that the defendant's publishing of advertisements containing inaccuracies was defamatory);
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (alleging that the defendant's actions constituted criminal
libel); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (alleging that the defendants violated ordinances
designed to prevent litter and fraudulent solicitation).
257 See also Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1152-53 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (granting summary
judgment to the defendants where the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the existence of a subliminal
message, or that the defendant's music incited imminent lawless activity).
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exposure to post-publication civil liability likely will be explored.258 Equally, due
regard must be had to long-stated judicial hesitance to impose negligence-based tort
liability for speech or expression. As the Court of Appeals noted in 1927:
Not every casual response, not every idle word, however damaging the
result, gives rise to a cause of action .... Liability in such cases arises
only where there is a duty, if one speaks at all, to give the correct
information. And that involves many considerations. There must be
knowledge, or its equivalent, that the information is desired for a
serious purpose; that he to whom it is given intends to rely and act
upon it; that, if false or erroneous, he will because of it be injured in
person or property. Finally, the relationship of the parties, arising out
of contract or otherwise, must be such that in morals and good
conscience the one has the right to rely upon the other for information,
and the other giving the information owes a duty to give it with care.259
Finally, web risk managers must understand that information torts that have
been relatively rare in real space likely will explode in virtual space. Of these,
potentially the most interesting pure content scenarios are cases dealing with
accurate but dangerous information.260 Additionally, interactive sites, particularly
those offering chat or forum features, will face claims based on alleged duties to
protect other participants. 26 1
VII. MANAGING CYBER-MALPRACTICE EXPOSURE
Because cyberspace liability exposure is a relatively new concept, managing
web risks is clearly in its infancy.262 Regulatory agencies have been slow to react, 263
and there are considerable doubts as to even telemedicine coverage under current
malpractice liability policies. 264 Indeed, at first sight, it seems that in their rush to
258 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); McCollum v. Friendly Hills
Travel Ctr., 217 Cal. Rptr. 919 (Ct. App. 1985); Hustler, 814 F.2d 1017; Aim v. Van Nostrand Reinhold
Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263 (1985).
259 International Products Co. v. Erie R.R. Co., 155 N.E. 662, 664 (1927).
260 For example, Hustler, 814 F.2d 1017, concerned the plaintiffs' 14-year-old decedent who took
his own life apparently attempting the practice of autoerotic asphyxia. He had read about the practice in
a Hustler Magazine article entitled Orgasm of Death. See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc,, 128 F.3d
233 (4th Cir. 1997), which concerned a book, HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR INDEPENDENT
CoNTrRAcrOas, which is also available for purchase over the web; see (visited Jan. 29, 1999)
<http://www.paladin-press.com/Default.htm>.
261 In Doe v. America Online, Inc., 718 So. 2d 385 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998), the plaintiff's I l-year-
old child was engaged by a pornographer who then distributed videotapes of the child engaged in sexual
acts. See id. at 386. The pornographer, an America Online (AOL) subscriber, allegedly used AOL chat
rooms to advertise and arrange the sale of the pornography. See id. It appears, however, that the
materials were not displayed on or transmitted via AOL. The plaintiff sued AOL primarily on the basis
that AOL breached an alleged duty to exercise reasonable care to ensure that its service not be used "to
market and distribute child pornographicmaterials." See id. at 386. The Florida court did not reach the
merits of the tort claim, dismissing all claims on the basis that AOL was protected by 47 U.S.C. § 230,
see id., discussed at text accompanying note 298.
262 But see Kristin B. Keltner, Note, Networked Health Information: Assuring Quality Control on
the Internet, 50 FED. COM. L.J. 417, 424-25 (1998) (noting that government has been protective of
network health information consumers).
263 Cf Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States, A Model Act to Regulate the
Practice of Medicine Across State Lines: An Introduction and Rationale (visited Mar. 7, 1999)
<http://www.fsmb.orgttelemed.htm> (noting that government support of telecommunications has risen
recently).
264 See, e.g., The Western Governors' Association, Telemedic Action Report (1996) (visited Mar.
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construct a web presence, health care providers have made little effort to manage
liability or financial exposure. In fact, risk management approaches are emerging, 265
though few of them seem destined for immediate success. This Article highlights
four approaches toward managing the risks of health care providers in cyberspace:
self-regulatory codes of conduct; disclaimers; site zoning; and the exploitation of the
federal immunity from civil suit granted to certain web publishers.
A. SELF-REGULATORY CODES OF CONDUCT
There is an embryonic movement towards cybermedicine sites complying with
self-regulatory codes of conduct. The leading advocate is the Health On the Net
Foundation (HON), describes itself as "dedicated to realising the benefits of the
Internet and related technologies in the fields of medicine and healthcare." "The
purpose of HON is to advance the development and application of new information
technologies, notably in the fields of health and medicine." 66 HON promulgated its
so-called Health On the Net Foundation Code of Conduct (HON Code), providing as
follows:
1. Any medical/health advice provided and hosted on this site will
only be given by medically/health trained and qualified professionals
unless a clear statement is made that a piece of advice offered is from a
non-medically/health qualified individual/organisation.
2. The information provided on this site is designed to support, not
replace, the relationship that exists between a patient/site visitor and
his/her existing physician.
3. Confidentiality of data relating to individual patients and visitors to
a medical/health Website, including their identity, is respected by this
Website. The Website owners undertake to honour or exceed the legal
requirements of medical/health information privacy that apply in the
country and state where the Website and mirror sites are located.
4. Where appropriate, information contained on this site will be
supported by clear references to source data and, where possible, have
specific HTML links to that data. The date when a clinical page was
last modified will be clearly displayed (e.g. at the bottom of the page).
5. Any claims relating to the benefits/performance of a specific
treatment, commercial product or service will be supported by
5, 1999) <http://www.health.state.nd.us/gov/hotnews/telemed.htm>:
There is significant uncertainty regarding whether malpractice insurance policies cover
services provided by telemedicine. Telemedicine networks that cross state lines create
additional uncertainties regarding the state where a malpractice lawsuit may be litigated
and the law that will be used. Will the lawsuit be heard in the state of the provider, the
patient, or in another state covered by the network? Which state's law will govern the
case? Choice of venue and choice of law issues can have significant financial
implications for the parties to litigation as states differ- in the statutory limits placed on
the amount of malpractice awards . . . Governors should direct their state insurance
commissions to review the current policies of the malpractice insurance industry with
regards to telemedicine, and to recommend changes that encourage insurers to develop
clear and consistent coverage policies.
Id. Note also that malpractice insurance tends to be state.centric, causing major coverage and rate-
setting issues when patients' consultations defy real space national and- international borders.
265 See Keltner, supra note 262,. at 427-28 (citing encryption programs and disclaimers as
protections).
266 About Health on the Net Foundation: Background (visited Mar. 7, 1999) <http://www.hon.ch/
Global>.
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appropriate, balanced evidence in the manner outlined above in
Principle 4.
6. The designers of this Website will seek to provide information in
the clearest possible manner and provide contact addresses for visitors
that seek further information or support. The Webmaster will display
his/her E-mail address clearly throughout the Website.
7. Support for this Website will be clearly identified, including the
identities of commercial and non-commercial organisations that have
contributed funding, services or material for the site.
8. If advertising is a source of funding it will be clearly stated. A brief
description of the advertising policy adopted by the Website owners
will be displayed on the site. Advertising and other promotional
material will be presented to viewers in a manner and context that
facilitates differentiation between it and the original material created by
the institution operating the site.267
A growing number of cybermedicine sites now display the HON Code logo 268 and
purport to comply with the code.269 As with all self-regulatory instruments, it will
have its greatest impact in cyber-malpractice cases as evidence of feasible or
customary practice.
B. DISCLAIMERS
There seem to be two discernible trends in cybermedicine disclaimers: 270
whether viewed as exculpatory statements or preinjury releases. The first seems to
assert few direct limitations on user rights but seeks to place the web content into a
subordinate role in an overall provider-patient relationship. For example, a site
might proclaim: "The health information contained herein is provided for
educational purposes only and is not intended to replace discussions with a
healthcare provider. All decisions regarding patient care must be made with a
healthcare provider and consider the unique characteristics of each patient."271
In contrast, a considerable number of cybermedicine sites now make use of
267 HON Code of Conduct (HON code)for Medical and Health Web Sites: Principles (visited Mar.
7, 1999) <http://www.hon.ch/Conduct.htini>.
268 HON Code of Conduct (HON code) for Medical and Health Web Sites: Introduction (visited
Mar. 7, 1999) <http://www.hon.ch/HONcode>.
269 See, e.g., The Breast Cancer Resource Guide for Massachusetts (visited Mar. 6, 1999)
<http://www.breasted.org>; The Washington Home and Hospice of Washington (visited Mar. 6, 1999)
<http://www.washingtonhome.org>. See also The Reynoldsburg, Ohio Lions Club (visited Mar. 6,
1999) <http://www.reynoldsburglions.org> (displaying little or no health or medical advice or links).
270 See Allina Disclaimer (visited Mar. 16, 1999) <http://www.allina.com/disclaimer.html>;
Mayoclinic: Online Service Agreement, Agreement (visited Mar. 6, 1999) <http://www.mayohealth.org/
mayo/common/htm/disclaim.htm>.
271 Viagra (visited Feb. 7, 1999) <http://www.viagra.com>. Part of the disclaimer published by
Allina Health System states:
Any medical or health care advice provided and hosted on the Allina Health Village
will only be given by medically trained and qualified professionals unless a clear
statement is made that a piece of advice offered is from an otherwise qualified healthcare
professional and/or healthcare organization. The information provided on this site is
designed to support, not replace, the relationship that exists between a patient/site visitor
and his/her existing physician.
Any use by you of this website or the information contained in the website is at your
own risk.
Allina Disclaimer, supra note 270.
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quite exhaustive disclaimers. What follows is from Glaxo Wellcome Inc., all of
whose product pages link to a common page that is referred to by the hyperlink as
"legal disclaimer and trademark information." 272 However, when opened, the
webpage is described as Copyright Infofor Glaxo Wellcome Inc. 273 Indeed, the first
paragraph of that linked page does contain intellectual property information.
However, the page then continues:
This publication is provided "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF
ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING,
BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE,
OR NON-INFRINGEMENT. Some jurisdictions do not allow the
exclusion of implied warranties, so the above exclusion may not apply
to you.
The Web site was developed as a service provided by Glaxo Wellcome
Inc. This Web site provides selected information available about a
range of disease topics. Like any printed material, it may become out
of date over time. It is important that consumers rely on the advice of a
health care professional to employ good clinical judgment for the
specific conditions of individual patients. This information is not
intended to be a substitute for the advice of a health care professional,
or a recommendation for any particular treatment plan. External sites
are not necessarily endorsed by Glaxo Wellcome Inc.
Certain links on this site lead to resources located on servers
maintained by third parties over whom Glaxo Wellcome Inc. has no
control. As such, Glaxo Wellcome Inc. makes no representation as to
the accuracy or any other aspect of the information contained on such
servers. 274
Interestingly, few attempts seem to have been made at making agreement to a
preinjury release a condition of site use or web community membership.27 5 Of
course, such a position would require navigation of the difficult areas of click-
wrap276 or click-through 277 contracting.278 Any examination of the legal effect of
272 See, e.g., Glaxo Wellcome, USA (visited Feb. 7, 1999) <http://www.gw-navelbine.com>
(discussing the product Navelbine).
273 (visited Mar. 7, 1999) <http://www.imgw.com/copyrite.htm>.
274 Id. The Schering-Plough disclaimer takes a less rigorous approach, providing:
Schering-Plough will use reasonable efforts to include accurate and up-to-date
information on this site, but makes no representations or warranties as to its accuracy or
completeness. Access to and use of the content is at your own risk, and neither
Schering-Plough nor any party involved in creating or delivering this site shall be liable
to you for any damage of any kind arising out of your access, use or inability to access or
use this site, or for any omissions or errors in its content.
Terms and Conditions (visited Mar. 24, 1999) <http://www.sch-plough.com/terms.html>.
275 See, e.g., Mayo Clinic: Online Service Agreement, supra note 270. This disclaimer ends with
hyperlinks that state:
L acept all of the foregoing terms either by clicking here or by any further use of the Service.
I do not accet all of the foregoing terms.
Id.
276 Click-wrap is described as consumers on their computers clicking on a box marked "I Agree."
See Click-wrap License Agreements (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http:l/www.ljx.com/internet/
0811clickwrap.html>; see also Law Journal Extra! Law of the Internet (visited Mar. 6, 1999)
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disclaimers in provider liability cases primarily is informed by the decision in Tunkl
v. Regents of the University of California.279 In Tunkl, the Supreme Court of
California invalidated a disclaimer clause in a hospital admission form, stating:
the patient here sought the services which the hospital offered to a
selective portion of the public; the patient, as the price of admission
and as a result of his inferior bargaining position, accepted a clause in a
contract of adhesion waiving the hospital's negligence; the patient
thereby subjected himself to control of the hospital and the possible
infliction of the negligence which he had thus been compelled to
waive. The hospital, under such circumstances, occupied a status
different than a mere private party; its contract with the patient affected
the public interest. 280
Other than hitting a speed bump with malpractice arbitration cases, 281 the Tunkl
approach has proven unassailable in health care provider cases.282 However, some
interesting fact-intensive issues could arise in regard to a disclaimer incorporated in
a website that had both marketing and professional advice content areas, and where
the plaintiff's allegations of, say, negligent advice covered data received from both
areas. 283
<http://www.ljx.cominternet/ir.ucc.html> (providing hyperlinks to articles that discuss click-wrap
issues such as the enforceability of click-wrap agreements).
277 "Click-through" is defined as the process of a visitor clicking on a web advertisement and
going to the advertiser's website. See PC Webopaedia: Click-Through (visited Mar. 17, 1999)
<http://www.pcwebopaedia.com/TERM/c/click through.html>.
278 See Hotmail Corp. v. Vans Money Pie, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
CLICK-WRAP agreements are contracts formed entirely over the Internet. A party posts
terms on its Website pursuant to which it offers to sell goods or services. To buy these
goods, the purchaser is required to indicate his assent to be bound by the terms of the
offer by his conduct-typically the act of clicking on a button stating "I agree." Once
the purchaser indicates his assent to be bound, the contract is formed on the posted
terms, and the sale is consummated. No paper record is created nor is the signature of
the purchaser required.
OUTSIDE COUNSEL: Click-Wrap Agreement Held Enforceable (visited Mar. 18, 1999)
<http://www.ljx.comlinternetl0630click.htmnl>.
279 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1963).
28 0 Id. at 447.
281 See, e.g., Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 552 P.2d 1178, 1186 (Cal. 1976) (finding that
the Tunkl approach did not apply, because the plaintiff enjoyed the opportunity to select from among
several medical plans, some not including arbitration provisions).
282 See Smith v Hosp. Auth. of Walker, Dade and Catoosa Counties, 287 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. Ct. App.
1981) (reversing a trial court summary judgment for defendant hospital, claiming that a blood donor's
signed release constituted a bar to the plaintiff's suit); Meiman v Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 444
S.W.2d 78 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (reversing a trial court's summary judgment for the defendant
rehabilitation center, attempting to rely on an exculpatory contract where defendant's care fell below
the relevant standard of care); Cudnik v. William Beaumont Hosp., 525 N.W.2d 891 (Mich. Ct. App.
1994) (invalidating an exculpatory agreement, executed by the plaintiff's decedent before receiving
radiation therapy at the defendant hospital); Ash v. New York Univ. Dental Ctr., 164 A.D.2d 366 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990) (invalidating exculpatory agreement required as a precondition to treatment, as against
the state's interest in the health and welfare of its citizens and the physician-patient relationship).
283 See Vodopest v. MacGregor, 913 P.2d 779 (Wash. 1996). In Vodopest, the plaintiff
participated in a hiking trek in Nepal designed to collect breathing data. See id. at 781. Prior to the
experiment, the plaintiff signed an injury release form. See id. The trial court found that the director of
the University of Washington Human Subjects Review Committee had rejected the form as invalid,
because the federal government did not allow exculpatory language in human subjects experimentation.
See id. at 781-82. The Washington Supreme Court concluded that "[to the extent the preinjury release.
. attempt(ed] to release the Defendant from negligent conduct during the research on high altitude
sickness, it is unenforceable." Id. at 789.
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Of course, disclaimer language is utilized strategically for more than purely
exculpatory reasons. At the process level, these include increasing unrepresented
consumer information costs and decreasing settlement values of cases. More
substantively, defendant statements contained in disclaimers will attempt to nullify
defendant representations or warranties and preempt counter-arguments to plaintiff
theories based on expectations. Thus, the use of disclaimers can be expected to
continue in website construction if for no other reason than that ever-optimistic
corporate legal counsel will insist on their inclusion.284
C. SITE ZONING
Site zoning or targeting, an issue much discussed in the web pornography
debate,28 5 concerns the issue of denying access to certain groups or segregating site
visitors into subpopulation specific areas.28 6 Although the pornography debate
centers on age verification systems or credit card surrogates, three different types of
attempted site zoning seem current on cybermedicine sites.
First and strongly related to the disclaimer issues discussed above, are sites that
reject responsibility for off-site content. 28 7 Such a statement does not just disclaim
liability; but it also serves as a powerful territorial statement. It may be thought that
no such disclaimer is necessary because there could not be any underlying liability
exposure. However, such site posting is likely to increase as health care sites
become more closely interlinked, and the provider industry becomes more tightly
integrated either at an ownership or cross-marketing level.288
The second major zoning attempt is in the demarcation of physician and patient
areas. In this context, consider again the Schering-Plough Claritin site discussed in
Part V.A. 289 Using site personalization and authentication, the site restricts access to
a physician-only area using a password or registration number from the Drug
Enforcement Agency.290 Contrast it with the Glaxo Wellcome Inc. products page,
accessible from its corporate site,29 1 which segregates "healthcare professionals
only" from "consumers only," but does not then inhibit, say, consumer access to
provider-only content. A related approach to site zoning is to differentiate between
members and nonmembers, as illustrated by the Oxford Health Plans site that
features a guest area, but requires a member personal identification number from
participating employers, physicians and patients. 292
284 It is arguable that the corporate counsel mindset encountered when dealing with web-based
information is almost totally informed by the practice of using over-long, excessively elaborate
copyright notices when placing any corporate content online.
285 See, e.g., Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (O'Connor J., concurring and dissenting)
(describing efforts to establish zones on the Internet and the constitutional and technological problems
that must be overcome to make this effective). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Zones Of Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REv. 1403 (1996) (discussing efforts to establish zones for adult material on the Internet).
2 8 6 See Lessig, supra note 285, at 1409.
287 See, e.g., Pfizer External Link Page (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http:l/www.pfizer.com/kpw/
explore/cgi-bin/xlink/nph-xlink.cgi?link--http://wwwhealthfinder.gov> (stating "You are now leaving
www.pfizer.com/exploringhealth. Links to these outside sites are provided as a resource to the viewer.
Pfizer accepts no responsibility for the content of linked sites.").
288 See supra note 18-24 and accompanying text.
289 See supra note 143-48and accompanying text.
290 See Schering-Plough (visited Feb. 7, 1999) <http://www.allergy-relief.comicgi-bin/
proinfo.cgi>.
291 See Glaxo Wellcome Inc., Product Sites (visited Feb. 7, 1999)
<http://www.glaxowellcome.comprodct.htm> (bypassing site frame).
292 See Oxford Employer Authentication Screen (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http://www.oxhp.con/
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The third identifiable zoning trend on provider websites, again particularly
those of pharmaceutical manufacturers, is to zone sites according to real space
geographical lines, for example, by reference to the regional or national origin of the
web consumer-patient. Thus, many manufacturers' sites proclaim that the informa-
tion provided is for US residents only.293 A few sites actually try to direct their
traffic 294 and provide country-specific information. 295
D. FEDERALLY GRANTED IMMUNITY
Finally, providing much needed relief from all this liability indeterminacy,
many provider sites will seek refuge in 47 U.S.C. § 230, a piece of federal legislation
tucked away in the Communications Decency Act.296 After an early flourish
suggesting possible internet service provider (ISP), host or publisher-licensee
liability for online content,297 section 230(c)(1) was enacted providing, "[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider."298
This has been interpreted to provide blanket immunity from tort liability299 for ISPs,
hosting services and others in the distribution process. 300 Therefore, sites that
corporate/auth/logemp.html> (requiring an Oxford identification number and a personal identification
number to proceed).
293 See Viagra (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http://www.viagra.com> (stating "The information
provided in this site is intended only for residents of the United States. The products discussed herein
may have different product labeling in different countries."); Glaxo Wellcome Inc., Product Sites
(visited Mar. 21, 1999) <http://www.glaxowellcome.com/prodct.htm> (stating that the information on
this site is intended for U.S. health care professionals and consumers only).
294 See Eli Lilly Products (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http://www.lilly.com/products/usa>
(attempting to route the user to particular sites without any authentication or technological zoning, such
as by IP address).
295 Compare Eli Lilly Canada-Health Online (visited Mar. 12, 1999) <http://www.lilly.cathealth-
on-line/header.html> (providing generalized disease and health information), with Eli Lilly Products
(visited Mar. 12, 1999) <http://www.lilly.com/products/usa/index.html> (providing direct access to
drug information). The following information is displayed when a user requests specific drug
information:
The following information is intended for use only by customers, patients, and health
care professionals in the United States. Countries outside the United States may have
regulatory requirements or medical practices which are different than those in the United
States and may require reference to different or additional information. Therefore, this
information may not be appropriate for use outside the United States.
Are you a resident of the United States or one of its territories, or are you a health care
professional practicing your profession in the United States or one of its territories?
No
Untitled (visited Mar. 18, 1999) <http://www.lilly.com/products/usa>.
296 Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 47
U.S.C. § 230 was one of the few provisions to survive Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
297 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 24 Media L. Rep. 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1995) (finding Prodigy was a publisher of statements about the plaintiff on its computer bulletin board).
298 47 U.S.C.S. § 230(c)(1) (1998).
299 Different issues arise in intellectual property cases. See, e.g., Online Copyright Infringement
Liability Limitation Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998) (limiting liability with regard to internet service
providers (ISPs) to material "published" on their sites with copyright law).
300 See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (denying the plaintiff's
argument that 47 U.S.C. § 230 left intact liability for interactive computer service providers who
possess notice of defamatory material posted through their services); Doe v. America Online, Inc., 718
So. 2d 385 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998) (dismissing the plaintiff's complaint that AOL was liable for not taking
appropriate action per AOL's Terms of Service and Rules of the Road when an AOL user lured
plaintiff's ten-year-old son into having sex, took photographs and offered the photographs in AOL chat
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merely host or sponsor3O' cybermedicine information provided by others should be
immune from tort liability. Section 230's correlate, of course, is that the provider of,
say, a cybermedicine website that itself authored the content published on the site
may be liable for any content-related liability, 302 assuming that a theory such as
those discussed above is adopted. 303
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article has only dealt with a fraction of the issues that exponential growth
in cybermedicine will expose. Additional pressing issues already include licensure
and other regulatory issues, data integrity issues, not limited to Y2K and electronic
patient data, and the growing privacy debate as it impacts e-commerce.
Unfortunately, extant, real space substantive rules dealing with information flow and
content liability are poorly realized, making mapping difficult. And, of course, any
general cyberspace law itself is immature. Most liability-oriented cases have been
poorly, generally vaguely, pleaded or have been primarily concerned with process
issues such as jurisdiction 304 or the interpretation of new statutory issues.
rooms).
301 Of course, this should not be read to suggest that a site sponsor would in any event be liable.
See, e.g., Archer v. Outboard Marine Corp., 908 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). The surviving victim
of a boating accident and widow and mother of other victim brought an action for damages against a
fishing tournament sponsor after a boating accident with a tournament competitor. See id. at 702. The
circuit court granted summary judgment for the tournament sponsor, and the plaintiffs appealed. See id.
The court of appeals held that: (1) sponsorship did not cause the crash, and (2) its sponsor did not
exercise sufficient control over a tournament to render it liable. See id. at 703-04. Cf. Rudolph v.
Arizona B.A.S.S. Federation, 898 P.2d 1000 (Ariz. App. 1995) (finding defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty to assure that all participants in a timed competition operated their boats safely and in a reasonable
manner without endangering the peace and safety of other persons in and about the lake where the
competition was held).
302 Although somewhat unclear in the opinion, this seems to have been the plaintiff's failing
argument in Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). "The term 'information content
provider' means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service."
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
303 See supra note 205-261 and accompanying text.
304 See, e.g., GTE New Media Servs. v. Ameritech Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15413 (D.D.C.
1998) (denying the defendant's Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, because the continuous contact the defendant's interactive websites had with the
forum district demonstrated that the defendants purposefully established minimum contacts, invoking
the benefits and privileges of conducting activities in the forum district); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v.
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment for the plaintiff Panavision,
because the defendant's actions were aimed at the plaintiff in the forum state, and caused the plaintiff to
suffer injury there); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 415 (9th Cir. 1997) (denying an
Arizona plaintiff's argument that a Florida defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction because
cyberspace is without borders, and a website that advertises a product or service is necessarily intended
for use on a world-wide basis); No-Mayo v. Memminger, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13154 (N.D. Cal.
1998) (granting summary judgment to the defendants, finding that defendants did not purposefully avail
themselves of the privilege of doing business in the forum state of California, and that the due process
requirements for personal jurisdiction were not met); Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson, 698 N.E.2d 816 (Ind.
App. Ct. 1998) (holding that the defendant's discussion of the plaintiff organization in his website,
without any other contacts, was not a minimum contact sufficient to allow the forum state to exercise
personal jurisdiction over him); Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997), aff'd 576 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998) (finding that the defendants were subject to personal
jurisdiction in Minnesota by advertising a forthcoming online gambling service on the Internet and by
developing from the Internet a mailing list that includes one or more Minnesota residents, thereby not
offending the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice).
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Although telemedicine has already attracted the attention of legal scholars, 305
this is nothing compared with the likely development of cybermedicine and cyber-
malpractice. The expansion of health care providers into virtual space will
fundamentally change their methods of operation, their relationships with peer
providers and patients and the types of interaction in which they indulge. Provider
choices of business models, combined with the novelty of many of the malpractice-
like claims that will result, and will wreak a sea change in health care provider
liability law, a changing risk allocation that likely will also reverberate in real space.
305 In the Lexis®-Nexis® Law Review file, there were 82 hits as of January 16, 1999. On the
same date there were no hits for "cybermedicine." In contrast, there have been some news items
discussing cybermedicine. See, e.g., 'Cybermedicine' causes concern, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 15,
1998, at E7; Jennings, supra note 182, at IA.; Docs Explore Whether Online Medicine Is Good
Medicine, supra note 27.
